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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The question of the degree to which tax measures can be considered as prohibited State aid 
has produced a series of case law in the European Courts. This is understandable since the 
subject is delicate – Member States’ fiscal autonomy is being confronted with EU law. The 
question has also been frequently revisited by European scholars.
1
 However, as Member 
States continuously adopt new types of tax measures and use them as tools of national 
policy making, the issue continues to provide for new questions. Said questions are 
interesting for legal scholars, but perhaps even more so for national legislators who wish to 
introduce new tax measures. As European economies struggle with the effects of the latest 
financial crisis, also citizens and media have a particular interest in how State aids, 
subsidies and tax burdens are being allocated. 
The subject of this dissertation is therefore quite topical. More precisely, my subject is 
indirect environmental taxation and its permissibility in light of the general prohibition of 
State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. That being said, the subject is particularly attached to 
three recent trends within the EU. First of all, the recent trends in taxation policy in EU 
Member States indicate an increasing focus on taxing consumption rather than income.
2
 In 
other words, indirect tax measures are becoming more important as measures for financing 
the economies of European States. Second, taxes are increasingly being used as 
instruments of policy-making. This is true especially for environmental policy. Third, tax 
measures as a form of State aid as defined in Article 107 TFEU have become more 
important in comparison to direct subsidies.
3
 For instance, in Finland the share of state aid 
granted through taxation has clearly increased during the last few years.
4
 
The focus of this dissertation is on environmental taxes, and specifically indirect 
environmental taxes. This aspect is related to the first trend within taxation as mentioned 
above, that is, the increased taxation of consumption. As this tendency is rather recent, 
indirect taxes have not yet been extensively assessed in terms of State aid.
5
 This 
                                                 
1 See, inter alia, Nicolaides 2001, Aldestam 2005, Micheau 2011 and Pistone 2012 
2 Taxation trends in the European Union: Data for EU Member States, Iceland and Norway, Eurostat, 
European Union 2012, 19-20 and 27 
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dissertation shall therefore provide for insight into the specific question of State aid and 
indirect taxation. 
The second trend referred to above, environmental policymaking by market based 
instruments such as taxes, relates to taxation being used as measures for attaining societal 
objectives. Such taxes are often referred to as Pigouvian taxes.
6
 The idea of introducing 
Pigouvian environmental taxes is line with what macroeconomists have presented as the 
‘double dividend’ for society.7 The double dividend-theory implies that the introduction of 
environmental taxes while simultaneously reducing the tax burden of labour without 
adding to the overall tax burden paves the way for a healthier physical environment and 
reduced unemployment.
8
 As environmental protection in particular receives a considerable 
part of State aids granted within the EU, Pigouvian environmental taxes are particularly 
interesting from a State aid perspective.
9
 Moreover, most environmental taxes include 
multiple derogations and exceptions. Such exceptions can be more or less permissible 
under State aid control. Therefore, while taxes are increasingly being used as instruments 
for pursuing environmental policy in EU Member States, tax measures such as exemptions, 
deferrals and tax base reductions are also used to relieve undertakings from their 
environmental fiscal burdens. Such a development is questionable in light of the 
environmental objectives of the EU and therefore worth a closer examination. 
The third issue referred to above is that of modernising environmental policies by means of 
market based instruments. These include taxes, but also the Emissions Trading System 
(‘ETS’).10 On a general note, promoting the use of marked based instruments in 
environmental policy can be seen as part of a long-lasting trend in the EU, pertinently 
described by Maduro as the spill-over effect of market integration rules into other areas of 
law.
11
 This means that as national environmental policy is increasingly made through 
taxation, it will become subject to the State aid control as well, whereas direct 
environmental regulation might escape it. However, in contrast to the theory of a double 
dividend referred to above, the restrictive nature of State aid control could be seen as 
                                                 
6 Kingston 2012, 170-171 
7 Ten Brink – Mazza 2013, 4; Kosonen 2012, 5-6; Määttä 2000, 180; 
8 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee: Tax policy in the European Union - Priorities for the years ahead, 23.5.2001, COM (2001) 
260 final. 
9 State Aid Scoreboard, Report on state aid granted by the EU Member States, Autumn 2012 update, 12 
December 2012, COM(2012) 778 final, 11 
10 Kingston 2012, 50 
11 Maduro 1998, 30 
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obstructing the positive effects of greening the taxes rather than promoting them. In short, 
the intersection between EU-wide State aid control on the one hand and national 
environmental taxes on the other, provide for a legal sphere where several different 
interests seem to conflict each other. In order to further the Internal Market on the one 
hand and improving the environment on the other, these conflicts should be resolved in a 
manner which is acceptable to the Member States as well as the EU as a whole. 
Finally, there is a practical issue related to the subject of this dissertation, which calling for 
a solution rather sooner than later. The ETS, which produced high hopes for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions, has encountered serious problems due to the decline in prices 
of energy and due to the European Parliament rejecting a recent amendment to the ETS 
seeking to intensify its impact.
12
 The effectiveness of the ETS as a marked based 
instrument, capable of reaching the environmental goals the EU has committed itself to, 
has become questionable. The most credible marked based instrument left to use is 
therefore environmental taxation, the adoption of which lies largely on the Member States. 
For this reason, national environmental tax measures deserve a thorough examination as to 
their acceptability under the provisions of State aid control. 
1.2. Aim and Questions at Issue 
The underlying theme of this dissertation is to look into what types of environmental taxes 
Member States can adopt while being subjected to State aid control. Answering this 
question can help national legislators develop effective environmental tax policies while 
complying with the requirements of State aid control. The more precise aim of this 
dissertation is to examine the intersection between national environmental taxation and the 
cumulative criteria for State aid as laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU. As mentioned 
above, this specific field of environmental protection, indirect tax policy and State aid 
control, has not been given too much attention in neither case law of the European 
Institutions or legal European literature. Despite their fairly important economic effects, in 
general, indirect taxes have not been as actively assessed in terms of State aid as direct 
taxes.
13
 Environmental taxes are mostly composed of indirect taxes. Environmental taxes
14
, 
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environmental State aid
15
 and fiscal State aid
16
 have generally been studied extensively, 
but only scarcely from a perspective which combines the three.
17
 
Therefore I shall study the intersection of these three fields of law. My assessment is 
constructed so as to identify the critical issues that arise particularly in relation to 
derogatory tax measures. This I shall do from a rather pragmatic angle, using practical 
examples of legislation in Member States to illustrate the critical points. Further, when 
identifying the specific issues related to environmental taxes when subjected to State aid 
control, I shall assess these issues in light of the main objectives connected with both State 
aid control and environmental policymaking through taxation. Finally, I shall attempt to 
draw some general conclusions on how environmental taxes should be designed in 
Member States with due regard to State aid control. Put concisely, my two main research 
questions are the following: 
1) What types of environmental taxes and derogations thereof are permissible in light of 
the criteria for forbidden State aid in Article 107(1) TFEU? 
2) How are the objectives behind State aid control and environmental policy in the EU 
taken into consideration in the above interpretation of environmental taxes? 
Moreover, based on the analysis of the above questions, I shall attempt to answer the 
following question by identifying a few practical guidelines which could be useful for 
national legislators: 
3) How should national legislators take State aid control into consideration when adopting 
national fiscal measures to pursue environmental policy? 
1.3. Structure and Delimitations 
Environmental aims are and should be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of 
tax measures with the provision concerning State aid control. However, there are 
uncertainties as to where in the process of State aid control the environmental concerns 
should matter.
18
 The topic of this dissertation is limited to the question of when 
environmental taxes are considered as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
                                                 
15 See inter alia Siikavirta 2007; Kingston 2012 
16 See inter alia Aldestam 2005; Micheau 2011; Quigley 2012; Terra 2012; Englisch 2013 
17 See Kingston 2012, 393ff 
18 Kingston 2012, 380 
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TFEU. Tax measures meeting the criteria of said Article must be notified to the 
Commission prior to adoption. Despite amounting to State aid under said article, 
environmental taxes can be permitted, as long as they have been properly notified to the 
Commission as required in Article 108(3) TFEU. The Commission may declare an aid 
compatible with the Internal Market if the aid falls under the scope of the exemptions in 
the second and third paragraphs of Article 107. 
However, the focus of the present dissertation is on the need to notify a tax measure in the 
first place, not on whether measures which have been notified can be declared permissible 
by the Commission. The reason for this is twofold. The first reason relates to the basis of 
the discussion on the feasibility of environmental taxation as a means of making 
environmental policy, that is, whether it is a suitable and efficient policy instrument. The 
notification procedure pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU may have been rendered smoother, 
but it does add to the administrative burden of national policy making hence making it less 
efficient. Moreover, the requirement to notify tax measures it is not entirely in line with the 
fact that taxation rests principally within the competence of the Member States.
19
 
Consequently the duty to ask for an approval from the Commission when adopting a tax 
measure could be seen as a something that hinders the exercise of national fiscal 
autonomy. 
The second reason for focusing on Article 107(1) is that the types of environmental aid 
which the Commission may accept relying on the provisions of Article 107(2) and 107(3) 
TFEU have been rather thoroughly defined in the Environmental Aid Guidelines.
20
. Thus 
there are in my mind fewer academically interesting issues related to aid measures which 
are declared compatible with the Internal Market upon notification. Moreover, the 
possibilities of exemptions are relatively limited, preconditioned and only accepted for 
limited periods of time.
21
 The notification procedure also requires for a significant 
administrative effort from the Member States. Therefore, I shall limit the examination of 
these exemptions provided for in the Treaty to a rather superficial review.
22
 
                                                 
19 See Chapter 2.1 
20 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJ C 82, 1 April 2008, p. 1-33 
(hereinafter ‘Environmental Aid Guidelines’) 
21 See for a similar justification of delimiting a study of State aids to Article 107(1) TFEU in Aldestam 2005, 
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As to the structure of the dissertation I shall first introduce the subject by briefly outlining 
the taxation policy and environmental taxation policy as well as their respective objectives 
within the EU. Second, I shall analyse the Commissions documentation and State aid case 
law concerning taxation in order to establish how the four cumulative criteria for defining 
prohibited state aid should be interpreted regarding fiscal State aid. Third, I shall analyse 
the criteria and their interpretation in light of environmental taxes. In the final part of this 
dissertation, the results of the assessment of environmental taxes shall be summarized and 
reviewed in light of the objectives of State aid control and of environmental protection in 
order to establish general recommendations for adopting environmental taxes. 
1.4. Method and Materials 
From the outset, my approach on the subject in this dissertation is that of legal dogmatics 
and systematising. A systemic approach to European law includes interpretation based on 
contextualising and harmonising, precedent rulings, legal analogy, conceptual and logical 
arguments, as well as arguments emphasising general principles of law.
23
  
The theoretical discussion in this dissertation is largely based on academic articles and it 
will appear in connection with each separate issue that arises when systematising the rules 
on State aid in the context of environmental taxes. This is a particularly suitable way of 
answering the first research question of this dissertation, because the purpose is to collect 
all relevant legal issues which reside in the cross section of the different fields of law 
addressed. Moreover, a systemic and dogmatic approach is justified as the subject has not 
yet been addressed in academic writing. A less generalist point of view could narrow the 
discussion too much as well as colour the dissertation by my subjective initial expectations. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged initial expectations can never be entirely excluded, 
as the author of legal dogmatics simultaneously forms part of the legal system which he or 
she is studying.
24
 However, as my thesis provides for an introductory discussion on the 
subject, I consciously attempt to apply an objective approach. In short, my method is much 
in line with traditional legal doctrine, applied on the context of EU legislation, of course. 
As the second research question focuses on the objectives of the legal fields examined, my 
approach also includes a teleological element. In order to establish the objectives of the 
legislation, I shall rely on the prime objectives of the Treaties, such as establishing a 
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functioning Internal Market. Moreover, I shall cover specifically environmental objectives, 
such as they have been expressed by the Commission and other EU institutions.
25
 The 
value of this approach is that it can reveal which objectives and which principles are 
dominant in a situation where two or several legal fields conflict. For instance, while 
environmental factors are increasingly taken into consideration in introducing taxes, the 
aforementioned legalistic-positivist approach of tax law limits the use of environmental 
arguments laws are in conflict or fail to provide an answer to a practical issue. The general 
principles of tax law adjust slowly to changes in society,
26
 whereas the ECJ’s practice 
constantly develops and refines legal principles with different fields of EU law, State aid 
law included.
27
 Especially tax cases where national and EU laws conflict have 
demonstrated that a straightforward legalistic approach can be insufficient.
28
 Moreover, 
certain hierarchies of principles and values can be inherent to the legal culture and its 
norms so that some are given more value than others in a confliction situation.
29
 It is 
therefore interesting to see how conflicts between environmental objectives and State aid 
control can be consolidated with regard to their differing objectives. 
Moreover, the subject matter of the dissertation, European tax law, has influenced the 
choice of method. In general, a dogmatics-based approach has been considered sufficient 
because of the traditionally legalistic principle within tax law.
30
 However, legal research 
within the field of taxation has also been criticised for being too concentrated on 
dogmatics, while neglecting the societal and political connections which are intrinsically 
linked to taxes.
31
 Therefore, my intention is to incorporate an instrumental approach
32
 to 
the examination of environmental tax law, particularly in connection with the third 
research question. In other words, I shall attempt to extract a few recommendations and 
guidelines on how to make good environmental tax policy at a national level when 
considering State aid control. Where applicable, I shall also refer to more general features 
of what has been considered as better and more efficient regulation.
33
 
                                                 
25 See Raitio 2010, 185-186 on teleological interpretation of EU law 
26 Wikström 2008, 13 
27 See for a summary of principles adopted by the ECJ, Raitio 2010, 248-250. 
28 Wikström 2005, 274 
29 See Tuori 2000, 199 
30 Wikström 2005, 273 
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32 Wikström 2011, 88 
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As to the materials used in this dissertation, the documents and research published for the 
account and by the Commission function as a point of departure. The Commission plays an 
important role in the State aid control system in the EU, as it alone can approve of state aid 
measures upon Member States’ notifications of new aid measures, or take action to against 
non-notified aid.
34
 Therefore, the Commission’s publications and decisions are of essential 
importance for the analysis of State aid control, and are thus frequently referred to in this 
dissertation.
35
 It is not uncommon, however, that the Commission’s decisions are re-
examined and sometimes overruled by the European Courts. Consequently the contribution 
of the Courts’ case law has contributed to the interpretation of State aid rules has been 
significant. As the jurisprudence is integrated in the Commission’s guidelines and other 
publications on a regular basis, an important part of the dissertation is based on the cases of 
the European Courts even when the essential content of those cases has subsequently been 
inserted into Commission Guidelines, for instance. Meanwhile, the ECJ and the GC every 
so often rely on the Commission’s Guidelines in their interpretation. This being the case, I 
refer to the Commission’s publications and the Courts’ jurisprudence alternately, without 
establishing a clear hierarchy between the two except for when the Commission’s 
decisions have clearly been overruled by the Courts. When discussing the more general 
policy objectives and principles behind State aid regulation, the Commissions policy 
documents are naturally the most essential references. 
In addition, I shall refer to current environmental taxes in a few Member States, notably in 
Finland and in France in order to provide for a more practical insight into the subject. My 
aim is, however, not to use comparative methods other than occasionally. Since the main 
interest in the subject matter is the relation between national law and EU law, comparing 
the national systems with each other would not necessarily bring much to the examination 
of the issue. 
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2. Taxation Policy in the EU 
2.1. The Competence of the EU and the Member States Concerning Taxation 
In the following I shall briefly present the basis for European tax integration by presenting 
the distribution of competences in tax issues between the EU and the Member States 
respectively. The question of competence is particularly relevant to the subject to this 
dissertation since State aid control restricts Member States’ freedom to pursue their own 
tax policies. Furthermore, I shall present the legislative tools that have been introduced by 
the EU in order to promote environmental aims by means of taxation, in other words the 
existing measures for the positive harmonisation of environmental taxes. This shall provide 
for the outset of the analysis of the negative harmonisation of environmental taxes through 
the prohibition of State aid.  
In the TFEU, the Member States have given the EU competence to legislate on taxation 
issues on three different levels, either by giving  
(1) exclusive competence to the EU,
36
  
(2) shared competence, where the Member States remain free to legislate as long as no EU 
legislation has been passed
37
 or  
(3) coordinating competence,
38
 where the EU may legislate on issues of coordination and 
supporting of the legislation which is in the competence of the Member States.
39
 
 As to the definition of competences in taxation issues, the foremost principle remains that 
Member States have the power to decide upon their national taxation systems. 
Nevertheless, due to the EU’s original nature as a customs union, all customs tariffs are the 
exclusive competence of the EU.
40
 Member States can thus not apply their own duties or 
charges of equivalent effect to products from other Member States or third countries.
41
 
Apart from customs, the fields of taxation which have been developed the furthest in terms 
of harmonisation on an EU level are indirect taxes such as excise taxes and value added 
tax, the legal basis of which is established in Article 113 TFEU. Said Article requires that 
                                                 
36
 See Article 3(a) TFEU 
37
 See Article 4 TFEU 
38
 See Article 6 TFEU 
39
 Terra – Wattel 2012, 9 
40
 See Article 28 TFEU and 3(a) TFEU 
41
 Terra – Wattel 2012, 10 
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indirect taxation be harmonised in order to ensure the establishment and functioning of the 
Internal Market. Despite this quite manifest plea for the adoption of EU legislation in the 
field of indirect taxation, the obligation to do so in practice still lies on the Member States, 
since proposals based on Article 113 TFEU must be adopted by unanimity in the Council.
42
 
That being said, the EU and Member States exercise shared competence in the field of 
indirect taxation. 
As a consequence of this, the Member States maintain a certain margin of discretion when 
it comes to indirect taxes. On the one hand, some areas of indirect taxes have not been 
harmonised at all, and thus allow for Member State to impose their own taxes as long as 
they do not breach any other provisions of EU law.
43
 On the other hand, as with most of 
the legal instruments at EU level, the harmonisation of indirect taxes is often based on 
minimum harmonisation. Member States are thus allowed to apply a stricter tax rate or 
scheme at a national level. This discretion must, similarly as in connection with non-
harmonised taxes, be exercised in compliance with EU law. In other words, Member States 
may in principle apply higher tax rates than those indicated in a directive, for instance 
Directive 2003/96/EC
44
 on the taxation of energy and electricity, but they must do so in 
compliance with all other provisions of EU law, including the provisions concerning State 
aid. Thus the Member States’ competence is circumscribed by how the ECJ interprets 
conflicts between national tax measures and State aid provisions. During the last ten years, 
indirect taxes have become increasingly important in the Commissions control of State aid 
measures, amounting to one third of the cases relating to fiscal aids in 2010/11.
45
  
As regards excise taxes, which are the main focus of this dissertation, typical excises to be 
harmonised on an EU level are those imposed on liquid fuels, alcohol and tobacco 
products, which have a set minimum tax rate defined in the relevant directives. Since the 
Adoption of Directive 2003/96/EC the scope of application of energy tax has been 
broadened to not only liquid fuels, but nearly all energy products.
46
 The taxes based on this 
directive are classified as environmental excise taxes for the purposes of this dissertation. 
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Direct taxes remain largely within the sole discretion of the Member States,
47
 although 
some directives on direct taxation have been adopted by unanimity in the Counsel.
48
 Those 
directives are based on Article 115 TFEU concerning legislation that directly affects the 
‘establishment or functioning of the internal market’.49 Moreover, the regulation 
concerning the European Economic Interest Grouping including a provision concerning the 
taxation thereof has been adopted on the basis of Article 352 TFEU, which permits any 
appropriate measures in realising Treaty objectives, when adopted with unanimity in the 
Council.
50
 In the field of direct taxation, taxes that relate directly to the internal market or 
to a more limited extent ‘appropriate measures’ thus fall within the competence of the EU, 
albeit that they need unanimity in the Council to be adopted. Other direct taxes fall within 
the exclusive competence of Member States. As stated by the ECJ on numerous occasions, 
the Member States must exercise their competence concerning direct taxes in compliance 
with EU law,
51
 thereby including Article 107 TFEU concerning State aid.  
As a consequence of both indirect and direct taxes being dependent on unanimous 
decisions of the Council, tax issues are still predominantly within the power of the Member 
States. However, certain important exceptions do apply, among those the rules concerning 
State aid. The Commission has the sole competence (in addition to the ECJ, naturally) to 
decide whether a tax measure is compatible with the rules concerning State aid, and any 
such national tax measure must be approved by the Commission before implementation. 
Naturally, Member States’ power to tax is constrained by limits produced by other 
provisions EU law as well, in particular the rules concerning free movement within the EU 
and the prohibition of distortive internal taxation provided for in Article 110 TFEU.
52
 
Nevertheless, State aid control remains one of the most restrictive limitations due to the 
requirement of prior control by the Commission. 
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2.2. Environmental Taxes in the EU 
2.2.1. Legal Basis 
Despite the EU’s origins being that of an economic project, environmental objectives have 
been present in the Treaties already since 1986,
53
 with the Commission introducing its first 
proposal on an environmental tax in 1992, basing the proposal on Articles 113 TFEU and 
192 TFEU.
54
 On a general level, the EU’s environmental policy is based on Article 3 TEU 
according to which the EU shall promote a high level of protection and improvement of the 
environment. Moreover, articles 191 and 192 TFEU define the objectives and principles of 
the environmental policies of the EU. 
One of the principles brought up in Article 192 is the Polluter Pays principle (‘PPP’), 
which merits a short definition as it shall be returned to in the assessment of environmental 
taxes as prohibited State aid. Described in broad terms the PPP signifies that the person 
who causes the environmental damage should also be liable to removing or redeeming it.
55
 
In economic terms the notion is closely linked to that of negative externalities. Negative 
externalities imply that not all economic effects of a production process are included in the 
costs of producing it, such as costs deriving from the environmental harm caused by 
production, the value of which the producer would normally not take into account.
56
 In the 
end, this means that someone else – often society – has to pay for the remediation of the 
harm caused to the environment. According to the Commission, one way of implementing 
the PPP, and thereby avoiding the problem of negative environmental externalities, is using 
market-based instruments to include the negative externalities in the production costs. In 
the absence of legislation on the EU level, the Commission recommends that Member 
States adopt national environmental taxes in order to implement the PPP in their national 
environmental policies.
57
 
The PPP is also a central notion in the Commission’s Green Paper on the introduction of 
Market Based Instruments for environment policy in the EU. The paper promotes the view 
according to which measures such as taxes, charges and the Emissions Trading Scheme 
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 Terra – Wattel 2012, 536 
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 Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, OJ C 196, 
3.8.1992, p. 1–8 
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 Määttä 1997, 19-20 
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(ETS) are the most efficient way of enforcing environmental objectives.
58
 As mentioned in 
the introduction to this dissertation, the ETS has not yet achieved the expected effects, 
which is why environmental taxes may play increasing role in future environmental 
policies of EU Member States. 
2.2.2. Defining Environmental Taxes 
The notion of an environmental tax has been defined by the Commission as ‘a tax whose 
specific tax base has a clear negative effect on the environment or which seeks to tax 
certain activities, goods or services so that the environmental costs may be included in 
their prince and/or so that producers and consumers are oriented towards activities which 
better respect the environment’.59 As can be read from the definition, the Commissions’ 
view of the notion ‘environmental tax’ is closely related to including negative externalities 
in production prices and thus PPP, which were discussed above. Environmental subsidies, 
including tax relief, are a typical a typical instrument of correcting market failures such as 
the omission of environmental costs incurred on society.
60
 In addition, environmental taxes 
incentivise undertakings and private persons to consume more environmentally friendly 
products and services. The definition therefore also includes for instance waste taxes, 
packaging taxes and charges for the use of water supplies.
61
 
However, normally environmental taxes which meet the description of the Commission are 
not applied uniformly, but encompass derogations and exemptions, justified by other 
policies. Such policies include maintaining competitiveness, preventing tax evasion, as 
well as promoting social and regional policy objectives. Derogations which aim at 
maintaining the competitiveness of undertakings subject to the environmental tax have 
been referred to as ‘competitiveness aid’ by the Commission.62 This type of tax relief has 
also been referred to as ‘harmful subsidies’ as regards the environment.63 This latter type 
of tax measures, aimed at reducing the burden caused by taxes with environmental aims, is 
more controversial as regards State aid than strictly cost-internalising tax measures. Such 
derogatory measures are therefore in the focus of this dissertation. 
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However, when it comes to said derogations from environmental taxes, it may be worth 
noting already at this stage that such derogations are often related to other important policy 
objectives. Such policy objectives include for instance promoting economic activity and 
social wellbeing.
64
 Such socially justified derogations may be particularly hard to assess in 
light of environmental objectives. In principle, any reduction of an environmental tax could 
be considered a ‘harmful subsidy’ which should be prohibited. Likewise, from the 
perspective of an average tax payer, for instance the reduction of energy taxes for energy 
intensive businesses seems rather contrary to the purpose of the tax.
65
 However, the 
border-crossing nature of many pollutants can make reductions from an environmental tax 
necessary – otherwise the polluting activity might be moved abroad, with the dissatisfying 
result of the amount of pollution remaining unaffected by the tax. Consequently, 
derogations from environmental taxes are often granted due to economic and social 
concerns. 
Derogations from tax measures may also be necessary when introducing new taxes in order 
to allow private parties to adjust to new environmental requirements. Gradually, these 
derogations can be removed so as to allow for a transition to a greener economy. The 
objective of moving towards a greener economy is line with what macroeconomists have 
presented as the ‘double dividend’ for society.66 The double dividend-theory implies that 
the introduction of environmental taxes while simultaneously reducing the tax burden of 
labour without adding to the overall tax burden paves the way for a healthier physical 
environment and reduced unemployment.
67
 From an administrative point of view, 
environmental taxes are also perceived as a convenient way of incentivising the 
introduction of environmentally friendlier behaviour.
68
 Taxes also provide for a less rigid 
control mechanism than categorical authorisations and prohibitions.
69
 In other words, 
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greening the taxation might lead to a ‘win-win’-situation for society without burdening 
companies with extensive administrative procedures.
70
 
Furthermore, researchers have pointed out that the definition of an environmental tax 
allows for a certain flexibility, which makes it a notion susceptible to ambiguity and even 
bias.
71
 This is true not only in situations such as the ones described above, where states 
apply derogative schemes from environmental taxes based on other policy objectives. In 
addition, many taxes which truly do confer tax advantages on environmentally friendly 
activities will also confer advantages with regard to other policy objectives, such as fiscal 
and allocative ones.
72
 Unsurprisingly, Member State might also use environmental aims as 
the outspoken objectives of a tax measure, while in reality pursuing taxes based on wholly 
different. This was the case in Sardinia, where a stopover tax on air traffic was levied only 
on operators domiciled outside Sardinia, despite the outspoken objectives of the tax being 
the protection of the Sardinian environment and coastal landscape heritage. The ECJ 
concluded that in light of the environmental objectives, domestic and non-domestic 
persons making stopovers on Sardinia caused equally harmful effects on the environment, 
and were thus in an objectively comparable situation, fulfilling the criteria of selectivity. 
The measure was considered to constitute both prohibited state aid as well as a non-
justified breach of the freedom to provide services.
73
 
2.2.3. Environmental Taxes in the Member States 
The Commission has identified three different categories of environmental within the EU. 
Those categories are (a) excise taxes, (b) VAT and (c) specific levies.
74
 The tax rates of 
these taxes very considerably between Member States, especially when it comes to excises, 
despite excise taxes being harmonised at a minimum level for many products. Many 
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Member States also apply additional excise taxes due to environmental considerations.
75
 
Member States have introduced a range of different environmental taxes such as motor 
vehicle registration taxes, water and waste charges, carbon tax and taxes on specific 
pollutants and pesticides.
76
 Specific levies have not been harmonised at a general level at 
all in the EU, however, some national environmental levies have been harmonised 
‘negatively’ by ECJ rulings, particularly as to their compatibility with Treaty provisions. 
Concerning the first category identified by the Commission, (a) environmental excise 
taxes, Directive 2003/96/EC harmonises the minimum tax rates of energy products and 
electricity in the Member States.
77
 The current objectives of the directive include 
improving the environment, whereas traditionally the objectives of energy taxation in the 
EU have been energy efficiency, security of supply and competitiveness.
78
 The minimum 
levels of taxation of heating and motor fuels and of electricity are defined in the Annexes 
of Directive 2003/96/EC, and due to the principle of substitution they also apply to 
equivalent liquid fuels which are not mentioned in the annexes.
79
 This clearly limits the 
Member States possibilities to reduce environmental excises as part of creating an 
attractive fiscal environment. By virtue of the directive, indirect taxation, with the 
exception of VAT, is in general prohibited for mineral oils used for purposes other than 
motor fuels or heating fuels. Another example is fuel for commercial air traffic, which 
must be exempt from excise tax.
80
 The mandatory exemptions also apply to other taxes 
which would result in a similar tax burden as the prohibited tax measure, even if such other 
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taxes would not be not harmonised on an EU level.
81
 However, in most respects the 
directive does allow for national environmental excises on the excise goods
82
 as well as 
national levies on other goods than those which have been harmonised.
83
 Moreover, 
Member States are allowed to differentiate the tax rates provided that they do not breach 
EU law, including the provisions concerning State aid.
84
 Consequently, the field of 
national environmental excises remains heterogeneous. 
The second category (b) in the classification of Commission, the VAT
85
, has been most 
affected by EU tax legislation. Member States have been able to make derogations from 
the VAT level on environmental grounds, as certain aspects of VAT remain within the 
discretion of the Member States.
86
 However, the use of environmental VAT rates is 
restricted by the fact that the amount and extent of derogative VAT rates is limited.
87
 The 
case law on the subject is therefore scarce, but it includes inter alia the Portuguese reduced 
VAT for the production and use of renewable energy resources.
88
 Although national 
environmentally based variations of VAT rates have not been subject to State aid control 
measures too often, it does not mean that VAT would be uncomplicated in terms of State 
aid. Instead, it seems that national differentiations of the VAT scheme are still something 
of an unmapped territory, and not only when it comes to environmentally justified 
variations. This is illustrated by the results of a study conducted on behalf of the 
Commission. The study showed an existing gap in all Member States between VAT 
receipts which had actually been accrued and the expected VAT. The gap ranged from 5 % 
to 30 % depending on the country.
89
 A part of this shortage of VAT is completely 
legitimate, whereas a part of it might be the result of derogations and reduced rates, which 
are not in line with the provisions on State aid.
90
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Furthermore, the third category identified by the Commission, (c) specific levies, has not 
been harmonised by EU legislation. The Commission has attempted to harmonise certain 
environmental levies through positive harmonisation, but without success.
91
 As positive 
harmonisation has not lead to any results, the ECJ has pushed for the negative 
harmonisation of environmental levies in cases concerning their compatibility with Treaty 
provisions. Motor vehicle registration taxes provide for a good example of a field of non-
harmonised specific levies which have given rise to a considerable amount of cases before 
the Commission and the ECJ.
92
 As negative harmonisation though case law is naturally 
more fragmented than what would be the case with directives for instance, registration 
taxes for motor vehicles still vary considerably across the EU.
93
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3. The Objectives of State Aid Control and Green Taxes 
3.1. An Internal Market without Harmful Tax Competition 
Originally, the essence of the purpose of State aid control has been the prevention of 
distortion of competition in the internal market deriving from state intervention.
94
 Further, 
its purpose is to prevent protectionism on the internal market. Protectionist measures are 
particularly harmful to the internal market as they prohibit products, services or capital 
from some Member States from entering the markets of others.
95
  
When it comes to taxation, State aid control can also be considered to be aimed at 
preventing harmful tax competition,
96
 although this approach on State aid objectives has 
also been criticised. According to some researchers, the aim of Article 107(1) TFEU is not 
to create a level playing field (in terms of taxation) for Member States competing to attract 
business investments, but to ensure undistorted competition between competing 
undertakings.
97
 Following this reasoning, State aid control can only target asymmetric 
regulation within individual Member States, but not strategic regulatory differentiation 
among them, because it does not apply tax measures that benefit all undertakings within 
one Member State equally.
98
 This view has been defended by Advocate General Jääskinen 
by saying that’ harmful […] tax competition clearly does not fall within the mechanism for 
controlling State aid’.99 
As the main focus of this dissertation is indirect environmental taxation, it is worthwhile to 
note that differences in turnover taxes do not entail an equal risk of harmful tax 
competition as do direct taxes, with the exception of areas with extensive consumer 
mobility.
100
 However, tax competition in the field of environmental taxes can be of a 
passive nature, meaning that Member States abstain from raising energy taxes as the expect 
other Member States to freeze their tax rates as well.
101
 Therefore, environmental tax 
subsidies can amount to detrimental competition in the EU regardless. Restricting selective 
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tax subsidies on a national level will thus also help protecting EU Member States from 
harmful tax competition within the EU.
102
 
Furthermore, there is at least one more objective that has been present in the Commissions 
decisions on aid measures notified under Article 108(3) TFEU. According to the 
Commission, State aid control has an important role in enhancing environmental 
sustainability in the European Union in accordance with the Europe 2020-strategy.
103
 State 
aid measures can be permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, provided that they are 
compatible with provisions of the Environmental Aid Guidelines.
104
 Fiscal aid which can 
be permitted due to environmental concerns is further discussed in Chapter 6.5. 
Summing it up, the main objectives of State aid control are preventing 
a) the distortion of competition,  
b) protectionist measures aimed at other Member States and  
c) harmful tax competition between Member States,  
although the legitimacy last objective is one that has been contested in legal doctrine. 
Moreover, environmental objectives are specifically taken into account when assessing the 
permissibility of notified aid measures. 
3.2. Internalising Environmental Costs by Means of Taxation 
Environmental taxes have been introduced both in national tax systems and on en EU level 
as a consequence of the current trends in environmental policy. In general, environmental 
policies, especially in the EU, are focused on promoting the introduction of so called 
market based instruments to be used on top of more traditional legalistic and administrative 
instruments.
105
 The change of focus from direct regulation to market based instruments is 
considered to have its origins in the Law and Economics movement. More generally, the 
market based instruments have their origin in the neoliberal ideologies of the 1980’s.106 
Promoting the introduction of environmental taxes coincides with the idea of adjusting the 
tax burden in society in a more profound way by reducing the tax burden of labour, since it 
has been considered to slow down growth. Instead, one should increase the tax burden of 
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activities that are harmful for the environment.
107
 The tendency to introduce environmental 
taxes or other market based instruments within the field of environmental policy has been 
adopted at a national level as well, albeit in differing extents in different Member States. 
The reasons for promoting market based instruments such as taxes are varied. It is 
characterising, however, for environmental taxes to take the form of Pigouvian taxes. 
Pigouvian taxation means that market actors are forced to take into account all relevant 
costs connected to their activities, much in line with the PPP described above in Chapter 
2.2.1.
108
 Moreover, tax measures can be connected to fiscal aims, that is, collection of 
revenues to the Member State. However, due to the incentivising nature of Pigouvian 
taxes, the actual revenue of an environmental tax is supposed to be reduced if and when the 
tax functions as desired. Fiscal aims are therefore normally less important than the aim of 
improving of the environment.
109
 Environmental taxes are often purposefully constructed 
to be fiscally neutral.
110
 Fiscally neutral environmental taxes are also recommended by the 
Commission.
111
 
In addition to the objective of internalising environmental externalities into the cost 
structure of undertakings, the objectives of freedom of choice for undertakings and 
consumers is often mentioned both in EU and OECD publications. The same can be said 
for the objective of simplifying regulation to reduce the administrative costs of 
environmental protection.
112
 The idea is to reduce administrative costs so that sustainable 
growth can be encouraged without risking detrimental effects on the overall 
competitiveness of undertakings.
113
 Moreover, many environmental taxes encompass 
derogations and exemptions precisely in order to maintain the competitiveness of 
undertakings producing substantive environmental externalities. 
Introducing market based instruments into European environmental policy has also been 
the focus of the Commissions policy work in the field of the environment. In a way the 
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national tendency of adopting marked based measures is both the cause and the 
consequence of similar measures being adopted in the EU. Making environmental policy 
with marked based instruments instead of direct regulation results in Treaty provisions 
becoming applicable on such fields of environmental policy, where the EU would not have 
had competence if the same objectives were pursued by means of direct national 
regulation.
114
 Simultaneously, Member States may adopt marked based instruments in their 
national environmental policies due to Commission documents encouraging them to do so, 
or owing to publicity from case law concerning the environmental policies of other 
Member States which can encourage (or discourage) allow others to benchmark their 
instruments. Another reason for why market based instruments have been promoted by the 
Commission is that instruments such as taxes and trading schemes provide for a continuous 
incentive to reduce polluting and environmentally harmful products and practices. If 
environmental standards were promoted only through legislating emission limits, the 
incentivising effect would be lost as soon as the emission limit would be achieved.
115
 In the 
absence of legislation on the EU level, the Commission has specifically suggested that 
Member States may adopt national environmental taxes in order to apply the PPP.
116
 To 
summarise the principle objectives of environmental taxation, both national and EU –level 
objectives can be categorised in four points: 
a) Internalising environmental externalities and implementing the PPP 
b) Simplifying regulation to reduce administrative costs 
c) Sustainable growth while maintaining competitiveness 
d) Providing an incentive to continuous improvement of the environment. 
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4. Fiscal State Aid and the Cumulative Criteria 
4.1. The Concept of Fiscal State Aid 
The ECJ has consistently held that the notion of State aid is broader than that of a subsidy, 
and that the notion of an aid cannot be exhaustively defined by the Commission.
117
 The 
notion is of a legal nature and should be defined by objective criteria.
118
 Moreover, State 
aid is not limited to positive measures, but includes any measure whatsoever, which frees 
an undertaking from a burden it would otherwise have to bear. The ECJ has stated on 
countless occasions that the notion also encompasses tax measures, as it includes all 
measures which, ‘in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in 
the budget of an undertaking’.119 
The above interpretation has been referred to as the ‘format neutrality’ of State aid.120 The 
format neutral approach has become gradually more visible also in the practice of State aid 
control. The Commission has taken on a more active role in removing tax measures which 
are not compatible with the provisions on State aid since the late 1990’s, when the Notice 
on State aid and direct taxation was published.
121
 Since then, also indirect taxation has 
been specifically mentioned in the Commission’s documents. For instance, in the 2004 
implementation report the Commission state that the Notice on direct taxation provides for 
a basis of analysis also for indirect taxes as State aid.
122
  
The format neutrality of state aid is closely connected to the effect principle, which is a 
critical element of notion of State aid.
123
 The effect principle as established by the ECJ 
entails that the decisive element in determining whether a measure constitutes State aid is 
not the cause of the measure, but the effects thereof.
124
 If aid can be granter in any form 
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what so ever, it is natural that it can only be identified through its effects. Aldestam has 
pointed out that Member States have become increasingly aware of the broadness of the 
scope of State aid control, which has prompted them to notifying tax measures to the 
Commission more frequently than before.
125
 Yet, the increased activity still seems to focus 
on direct taxation, whereas indirect taxes have not been assessed as frequently in the 
Commission’s and the ECJs practice, at least not when considering their importance in 
terms of tax revenues. Nevertheless, environmental taxes have already been subject to 
some proceedings, and more might be expected in the future, as the next State aid 
modernisation project is already up-and-running, including a future amendment of the 
Environmental Aid Guidelines.
126
 
4.2. The Four Cumulative Criteria  
In order for a state measure to be classified as prohibited state aid in accordance with 
Article 107 TFEU, the measure must fulfil four cumulative criteria expressed in the 
article.
127
 If only one of the criteria is not met, then the measure in question cannot be 
classified as State aid. The same criteria naturally apply to taxation measures as well.
128
 
The interpretation of these criteria has mainly been established by the ECJ in its case law 
concerning state aid, but the implications of the case law have also been codified and 
clarified in a number of Commission guidelines, notices and communications.
129
 
Moreover, the Member States may have their own codifications concerning the practical 
implications or procedural questions related to applying Article 107 TFEU.
130
 
The four cumulative criteria included in Article 107 TFEU are the following: 
(1) There must an advantage conferred on an undertaking;
131
 
(2) which is (i) granted by the State and (ii) through its resources; 
(3) which favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in other words, 
the aid must be selective; 
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(4) and the aid must be (i) liable to distort competition and (ii) affect interstate trade.
132
 
Whenever all of the criteria above are fulfilled simultaneously, the measure in question 
constitutes State aid and must be notified to the Commission in compliance with the State 
aid procedure regulation.
133
 However, the above criteria are not always presented in the 
same way.
134
 Some criteria are considered to be interlinked in such a way that it is 
impossible to distinguish between them. Making rigid distinctions between different 
criteria may lead to difficulties in the assessment of a certain measure’s compatibility with 
Article 107 TFEU.
135
 Particularly conditions (1) and (3) often coincide and can be 
presented as one single condition,
136
 whereas the fourth criterion can be divided in to two 
separate criteria; first, that of liability to distort competition and second, that of affecting 
interstate trade.
137
 The ECJ therefore normally presents the criteria as: 
(a) intervention by the State and through State resources 
(b) liable to affect trade between Member States 
(c) conferring a selective advantage on undertakings 
(d) distorting or threatening to distort competition.
138
 
In the interest of giving a balanced presentation I shall separate between conditions (1) 
advantage conferred and (3) selectivity. Since the criteria 4(i) liable to distort competition 
and 4(ii) effect on interstate trade are significantly interdependent and they have been 
given only limited attention in the case law of the ECJ, the two conditions shall be 
analysed together.
139
 
4.3. Advantage Conferred on an Undertaking 
In the case of taxation, it often follows from the nature of fiscal state aid, that the first 
criterion concerning an advantage conferred on an undertaking can often be presumed to 
be fulfilled. The concept of an undertaking may, however, at times require some 
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clarification.
140
 The case law on the subject is vast, but in principle an undertaking is a 
private entity, not acting in the capacity of a public authority, who offers goods or services 
against remuneration on a market and who neither receives an unequal value for what it 
offers, nor has its transactions mandated by the state.
141
 By contrast, non-profit-making 
organisations which are active in a purely social function are not regarded as 
undertakings.
142
 Moreover, when it comes to indirect taxes, their purpose is to tax 
consumption, whereby consumers are often touched by tax measures. As consumers are 
not undertakings by definition, the concept of conferring an advantage becomes somewhat 
less obviously fulfilled where indirect tax measures are assessed. 
Furthermore, the presumption of tax measures normally fulfilling the criterion of an 
advantage being conferred has been upheld by the ECJ.
143
 In tax cases the criterion of 
selectivity and that of an advantage conferred are deeply intertwined, and must not 
necessarily be treated separately.
144
 Nevertheless, in a recent Advocate General opinion, 
the two conditions of advantage conferred and selectivity have been kept apart as two 
separate conditions even if the case concerned a tax measure.
145
 Apart from the question of 
determining whether the recipient of the advantage is an undertaking, I find that there are 
only very limited occasions when the two criteria should be separated in the context of 
fiscal aid.
146
  
In general, the main reason to separate the two relates to the fact that some forms of aid 
should not be considered as advantages even if they are selective, since they have been 
conferred by State on equal terms as they would have been obtain from the market. A state 
can thus exercise economic activities in the role of a shareholder for instance, whereby its 
actions can be compared to the actions of private market actors.
147
 In other than tax related 
cases, the criterion of an advantage being conferred is therefore usually verified by 
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applying the Private Investor Principle (hereinafter ‘PIP’)148 as introduced by the 
Commission.
149
 The PIP essentially entails that a commercially justifiable financial 
measure which a private investor would adopt does not under normal conditions amount to 
State aid.
150
 A private investor could not in reality adopt a tax measure, whereby taxes are 
public by nature. Therefore they are not comparable to a situation on the market that a 
private investor might face.
151
 The GC has recently defended this view and stated that the 
conduct of the State should never be compared to that of a Private Investor when the State 
acts in its role of a public authority.
152
 Even generally speaking, the application of the PIP 
on aid measures entails some rather debatable restrictions on Member State sovereignty, 
but these issues fall outside the scope of this dissertation.
153
 
For purposes of clarity, however, it should be pointed out that there may be exceptional 
situations where fiscal measures can be subjected to the PIP-test and pass it, thereby not 
constituting State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. First, the tax authorities of a state may 
become tax creditor in cases of bankruptcy. In such case, the tax authorities are imposed a 
double role as both a private creditors, striving for a result which is commercially 
satisfying, but also a public actor, whose interests include the survival of the company for 
reasons of employment and future tax revenues. Therefore, the State might be inclined to 
pardon, reduce or modify a tax debt of an undertaking in financial difficulties. In order to 
distinguish measures which confer an advantage on the recipient from those that are a part 
of normal creditor procedure, the PIP, or more precisely, the Private Creditor Principle, has 
been applied by the ECJ.
154
 The same would naturally apply to a situation where the State 
would act as a creditor for environmental taxes. 
Second, the PIP has been applied to a situation where a public company was granted a tax 
benefit. As the Member State was a shareholder of the company which benefitted from the 
tax advantage, the measure taken was considered to be comparable to a capital injection, 
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and was thus to be analysed under the PIP despite the advantage being granted in the form 
of tax relief.
155
 As the distinction between the State as a public actor and a private actor 
continue to erode in many Member States, the relevance of the PIP may be increase in 
future tax related State aid cases.
156
 
4.4. Granted by the State and through its Resources 
4.4.1. Granted by the State 
The second criterion is a can be divided in two parts, and has therefore been called the 
double control criterion.
157
 First, the aid must be granted by the state, meaning either 
national or regional authorities, or public undertakings.
158
 Second, the aid must be granted 
through state resources. Earlier on it was somewhat unclear how the wording of the article 
was to be interpreted, that is, whether both partial conditions were to be fulfilled at the 
same time or if it was sufficient that aid was either granted by the state or that it was 
granted through state resources.
159
 The ECJ has since clarified that both partial conditions 
must be fulfilled in order to fulfil the criterion.
160
 
As regards tax measures, this criterion can normally be presumed to be fulfilled as to both 
of the partial conditions due to the obvious connection between taxation measures and state 
resources. As expressed by Advocate General Kokott, ‘a measure by which the public 
authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption which, although not involving a 
transfer of State resources, places the persons to whom the tax exemption applies in a 
more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers, constitutes State aid within the 
meaning of Article [107(1) TFEU]’.161 In this regard, there should be no distinction made 
between taxation measures which grant an advantage by an exemption from a tax or by 
defining the scope of a tax so that it does not touch certain products or their producers.
162
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However, the measure must also be imputable on the state, hence not a mere 
coincidence.
163
 Due to the principle of legality of taxation, national tax measures are 
normally imputable on the State by law. The requirement of imputability is thus usually 
not contested in tax matters.
164
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is worth bearing in mind that also provisions of EU law 
might require the adoption of tax measures. Implementing EU tax legislation may give rise 
to a certain product or industry being treated favourably. It is clear that measures 
necessitated by EU law cannot be imputed on a single Member State but rather the EU as a 
whole, whereby such measures do not constitute State aid.
165
 The distinction between 
Union aid and State aid is therefore crucial to the application of Article 107(1) TFEU.
166
 
Distinguishing Union aid from State aid is particularly critical in issues of indirect taxation, 
and will therefore be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5.2.1 in connection with 
indirect environmental taxes. 
4.4.2. Granted Through State Resources 
The second part of the criterion concerning the aid being granted through state resources 
entails that State aid must include the use of State resources, whatever form it might 
take.
167
 The criterion is such as to capture not only manifest and visible ways of 
transferring State resources to private undertakings, but also finely designed and discrete 
means of allocating resources.
168
 Consequently, tax measures do not often escape the 
criterion. The Commission has established that granting a tax concession results in loss of 
revenues for the State, which should be interpreted as the State indirectly transferring 
resources to the recipient.
 169
 Other forms of aid do not necessarily involve any State 
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funding, even when they confer advantages on undertakings. Such advantages cannot be 
regarded as State aid.
170
 
However, it is worthwhile noting that the fact that losses incurred on the State are 
compensated by other incomes received by the State does not remove the element of aid 
being granted through State resources. Therefore, one cannot take into account the fact that 
a tax concession might be incentivising and lead to increased revenues for those subject to 
the tax, thereby giving rise to increased tax revenues for the State and offsetting the costs 
of the tax advantage granted in the first place. The positive overall effect that tax relief 
might have on public revenues does not change the fact that the aid is considered to have 
been granted through State resources.
171
 Interestingly, however, it would seem from the 
wording used by the CG that the general rule of State control over the resources can be 
rebutted, if a measure to offset the deferment of tax revenues is directly imposed on the 
recipient. That can be done for instance by requiring that a deposit be paid to the State in 
compensation.
172
 
Furthermore, the ECJ’s interpretation of the condition of ‘granted through state resources’ 
has been broad as measures which have neither been directly or indirectly funded by the 
State have been regarded as State aid. This has been the case where resources have been 
under the control of the State, whereby the aid has been considered to be granted through 
State resources even when it has not involved any State funds.
173
 However, the broad 
interpretation does not extend to measures which are entirely privately funded, as was 
confirmed in the frequently cited case PreussenElektra. The case concerned an obligation 
imposed by the state to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources at a 
fixed minimum price, but included neither direct nor indirect transfer of State resources, 
and thus did not amount to aid.
174
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4.5. Selectivity of the Measure 
4.5.1. Selective and General Measures 
The third criterion, selectivity, is quite often the most substantial one in the ECJ’s test on 
prohibited state aid, and therefore deserves a detailed examination. The criterion is crucial 
not only in tax related cases,
175
 but in most other State aid cases as well.
176
 Selectivity 
indicates that the tax measure in question favours certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods based on, inter alia, an exception from a tax provision of a legislative, 
regulatory or administrative nature or the practice of the tax authorities.
177
 Despite 
different versions being presented by the Commission and the European Courts, the most 
cited definition of selectivity seems to be that of a selective tax measure being one that 
favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in comparison with others 
which are in a comparable legal and factual situation.
178
 In more recent cases, the ECJ has 
added to the definition the notion of the undertakings treated differently having to be 
comparable in ‘light of the objective pursued by the measure in question’.179 
Furthermore, a tax measure can be selective either to its material or geographic scope, 
which are addressed separately in the following chapters.
180
 According to established case 
law of the ECJ, a measure is selective also if the authority issuing it has significant 
discretion over choosing the recipients, since a wide discretion makes it impossible to 
predict whether the measure will, in fact, end up favouring certain undertakings or certain 
goods.
181
 Selectivity can also be described as a counterpart to the notion of discrimination, 
essential to Internal Market law, as selectivity implies positive treatment of an undertaking 
as opposed to discrimination which implies negative treatment.
182
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Moreover, in relation to tax matters selectivity is often described by distinguishing 
selective measures from general tax measures, which are not prohibited under the rules 
concerning State aid.
183
 According to the Commission, a general tax measure is one that is 
applicable to all operators on equal terms and where the tax authority has no discretion 
over granting the tax benefit.
184
 Despite its common language connotations, it noteworthy 
that the term ‘general measure’ is not related to the number of eligible undertakings nor 
the diversity and size of the sectors touched by the measure.
185
 The Commission has 
clarified the notion of a general measure in its notice on business taxation in 1998. 
According to the Commission, technical measures as well as pursuing national policies by 
means of tax measures is in principle allowed as being general measures even if they might 
confer some advantages on certain sectors. Measures such as depreciations are therefore 
allowed,
186
 as well as for instance reducing the tax burden of labour even though that 
indirectly favours labour intensive sectors.
187
 Other technical tax measures include 
progressivity of a tax, which is normally considered to be a general measure.
188
 In contrast, 
regressive taxation has been interpreted as an indication of selectivity.
189
 In the case law of 
the ECJ, examples of general measures include measures an Italian tax measure promoting 
regularisation of firms in the black economy and a Dutch measure reducing the tax burden 
of the employer of employees in R&D –projects.190 
Furthermore, the generality of a tax measure can be viewed as an element related to the 
how the national tax system is constructed. Hence, the ECJ has consistently held that a tax 
measure which can be justified by the general scheme of the taxation system in the 
Member State in question does not satisfy the condition of selectivity.
191
 Adhering to the 
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general scheme of the taxation system, or passing the ‘system test’ as it is often referred to, 
means in essence that a tax measure is a direct result of the guiding principles of the 
national tax system.
192
 Justifying a prima facie selective tax measure by the fact that it 
adheres to the general taxation system of the Member State is a test developed by the ECJ 
to assess selectivity in tax cases. 
The notion of ‘justifying’ the tax measure can be misleading as concept in this context, 
since as Englisch puts it quite convincingly, it is rather a question of ruling out the need for 
any justification under Article 107 TFEU.
193
 If the tax measure is a consequence of the 
national tax system, the Article should not become applicable at all. This approach has in 
turn been criticised for going beyond the wording of the Treaty and for allowing Member 
States to circumvent the application of article 107(1) TFEU, whose wording includes no 
reference to the possibility of such justification.
194
 However, excluding the possibility to 
refer to the national tax system as an indication of the generality of a tax measure would in 
my mind be rather restrictive on Member States’ fiscal autonomy. Therefore, I agree with 
Englisch to the extent that the system test can be seen as a test for the generality of a tax 
measure, and not as a separate justification for a measure which is prima facie selective. In 
other words, a tax measure which pursues the general economic policy of a Member State 
by adhering to the guiding principles of that particular national tax system is a general tax 
measure by definition, and cannot be regarded as selective in the first place.
195
 
4.5.2. Geographic Selectivity and Regional Autonomy 
The notion of geographic selectivity entails that an otherwise general tax measure can 
become selective if it is applied to undertakings within a certain region.
196
 However, 
selected regions within the EU have attained an autonomous position which is broad 
enough to create a politically and economically autonomous area, where taxation is the 
sole responsibility of the region. Where the regional authority is sufficiently autonomous, it 
is the regional area that constitutes the frame of reference in the selectivity test, as opposed 
to the benchmark being the entire Member State. This means that a reduced tax rate within 
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a region could in principle be seen as non-selective, even if the rate would be lower in the 
rest of the country, if the rate is applied consistently and generally within the region.
197
 
As to the assessment of geographic selectivity, the ECJ has established an interpretation 
concerning regional autonomy in the Azores-case.
 198
 Here, the ECJ held that in order for a 
tax measure to be considered State aid, the criteria of an advantage conferred must be 
assessed based on the normal level taxation in the relevant geographical area, which the 
Portuguese government argued to be Azores as a region.
199
 In order to draw such a 
conclusion, however, the region in question must be sufficiently autonomous in relation to 
the central government, so as allow for the benchmark tax rate in the selectivity test to be 
limited regional geographical area and not the entire Member State.
200
 Otherwise Member 
States could circumvent the selectivity test by decentralising certain limited taxation 
competences to regional authorities, while retaining the power to change, annul or adjust 
the regional tax rates.
201
 In other words, there is a fine line between exercising regional 
fiscal autonomy and allocating State aid to a certain region.
202
 Accordingly, the ECJ 
developed a test in order to distinguish between the two. The test adopted requires that the 
region in question meets the conditions of institutional, procedural and economic 
autonomy.
203
  
Contrary to the more recent case of Gibraltar, the ECJ found that in the end, the Azores 
region was not sufficiently autonomous in economic terms. The conclusion was based on 
the fact that the Portuguese government could not prove that the loss of tax revenue due to 
the tax reduction in the Azores was not compensated by budgetary allocations of state 
funds.
204
 In Gibraltar, however, the ECJ found that the preferential tax rate on offshore 
companies was not to be compared with the general tax rate in the UK, but instead it was 
to be compared with the tax burden of other companies in Gibraltar, since the region 
upholds a tax system of its own,
205
 as the potential losses to be incurred by the tax 
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reductions were not to be offset by any subsidy from the UK.
206
 The conclusion to be 
drawn from these cases is that economic autonomy can only exist if financial tax 
consequences are not offset by means of state funding, which has been allocated 
specifically in order to cover the tax consequences in question.
207
 
4.5.3. The Derogation Approach and Critique Thereof 
The definition of material selectivity is less coherent in the case law of the ECJ than that of 
geographic selectivity.
208
 As regards tax measures, the assessment of material selectivity 
has been interpreted as being based on a so called ‘derogation approach’.209 The 
derogation approach entails that a tax measure must constitute a derogation from the 
general tax scheme to satisfy the criterion of selectivity, meaning that the tax measure in 
question must depart from the normally applicable tax treatment.
210
 The derogation 
approach can be seen as limiting the Commission’s competence to review national tax 
measures, thus respecting the Member States’ competence in tax issues.211 
The approach has been criticised by various scholars, arguing that selectivity may be the 
result of both a reduced tax rate and the fact that some other sector is being taxed more 
heavily than other similar sectors.
212
 According to this view, an aid can be selective even 
when it does not constitute a derogation, but simply because the scope of the tax measure 
is too narrowly defined in relation to its alleged and actual objectives.
213
 
The derogation approach has, however, been applied in the case law of the Courts. The 
application of the approach on selectivity gives rise to a two-stage test.
214
 The first stage of 
the test entails identifying the normal tax burden as a frame of reference, and only in the 
second stage can the potential derogation from it be detected. In the second stage the 
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measure can be assessed as to whether it amounts to selectively benefitting certain 
undertakings as opposed to other which are in a similar factual and legal situation.
215
 
Yet for the purpose of Article 107 TFEU it seems unjustified that one would have to define 
which tax is the ‘normal’ tax and which one is the derogation. It can for instance be 
difficult to determine whether it is the lower tax rate which amounts to State aid when 
compared to the higher tax rate, or if it is the non-taxed products or industries which 
receive State aid when compared to those paying either the lower or the higher rate.
216
 
Moreover, defining a normal rate entails the issue of selecting a frame of reference – either 
wide or narrow. Micheau has illustrated the issue with the example of business taxation. In 
her example, a tax measure might seem selective in comparison to the general system of 
business taxation but in comparison with a narrower frame of reference, say the business 
taxation of SMEs, the measure could seem general.
217
 Derogations from tax treatment, 
which already in itself is a derogation from a main rule complicate the process of 
determining the correct frame of reference and thereby the normal rate tax. This issue has 
been present in cases concerning the carry-forward of losses after changes of ownership.
218
  
In addition, requiring a normal rate to be defined becomes problematic if the difference in 
taxation does not follow from the derogative nature of the tax measure, but the ‘normal’ 
application of the tax;
219
 or where the tax is asymmetrically formulated in relation to the 
factual situation of the taxable persons.
220
 One could say that this is the case when the State 
deliberately sets out to favour a group of undertakings by imposing a tax on one group, but 
leaving out the one that is favoured from the scope of the tax.
221
 Therefore, an approach 
which does not necessitate the definition of the normal tax and the derogatory tax is more 
functional when assessing complex tax measures. 
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On a few occasions, even the ECJ has departed from a strict derogation approach.
222
 The 
ECJ took the view that that the derogation approach would lead to an interpretation where 
the selectivity-condition would require for a certain regulatory technique to be applied in 
order to qualify for state aid, which would be a rather formalistic view of fiscal selectivity. 
Such interpretation would have been and in contrast with the well-established effect 
principle.
223
 As the ECJ has later again returned to an interpretation in line with its earlier 
derogation approach, the legal situation still awaits final confirmation.
224
 Also, the 
practical problem of calculating of the amount of fiscal State aid without determining the 
normal level of taxation remains.
225
 
4.6. Effect on Trade and Liability to Distort Competition 
As mentioned before, the two conditions of liability to distort competition and the effects 
on trade between Member States are tightly intertwined as any measure which affects cross 
border trade will inevitably be at least liable to distort competition.
226
 Therefore, if one of 
the two conditions is considered to be met, the same will normally apply to the other one. 
The application of these conditions to tax cases does not differ from that of other types of 
aid.
227
 In general, the Commission has interpreted both conditions broadly.
228
 
As to the effect on trade between Member States, the Commission is obliged to not only 
take into account the current intra-union trade of the product or service in question, but 
also any potential trade in the future.
229
 Consequently, any measure that decreases the 
production costs of national products is liable to have an effect on trade between Member 
States, since producers of similar products from other Member States will consequently be 
less inclined to export their products to the country applying the production cost reducing 
measure.
230
 The scale of the effect on trade is not relevant in the assessment, which has 
been made clear in case law where neither a) the market share of the undertakings 
receiving a tax advantage
231
 nor b) the fact that the undertaking trades nearly exclusively 
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with non EU states
232
 have amounted to escaping the criterion, as long as the undertakings 
compete with other undertakings in the EU. In light of such a wide interpretation of ‘effect 
on trade between Member States’ it is indeed difficult to imagine a situation where a tax 
related or other aid measure would not have an effect on interstate trade.
233
  
Nevertheless, the ECJ’s line of argumentation has demonstrated that it is the character of 
the market that ultimately determines whether a measure affects trade between Member 
States.
234
 In fact, on a few occasions concerning local investment aids to SGEI services the 
Commission has concluded that trade is not affected.
235
 By analogy, even a tax incentive, if 
applicable to a very specific or local market with little or no competition from other 
undertakings, could exceptionally escape the criterion.
236
 The small scale of the sector 
being aided can also be relevant in the sense that tax reductions granted to small sectors 
amount to less aid in total than aid to large sectors, thus being more likely to fall under the 
threshold of the de minimis-regulation
237
 whereby the aid would not be considered to affect 
interstate trade.
 238
 Moreover, aid which is in granted in compliance with the de minimis-
regulation is not notifiable under Article 108(3) even when it meets all criteria under 
Article 107 TFEU.
239
 In conclusion it seems that the Commission need little proof to be 
convinced that both conditions are fulfilled – namely that the amount of the aid exceeds the 
threshold of the de minimis-regulation.
240
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5. Environmental Taxes under 107 TFEU 
5.1. The Dilemma of the Recipient of an Advantage 
5.1.1. Empirical Indications of the Recipient of Indirect Fiscal Aid 
As mentioned in Chapter 4.3 above, the first of the four cumulative criteria for State aid 
under Article 107(1) TFEU usually doesn’t demand an extensive assessment by the 
Commission in order to be confirmed. However, environmental taxes are normally indirect 
taxes, which are by nature such as to allow the taxable undertakings to trickle down the tax 
burden to be borne by the final consumer.
241
 It follows that there can be more than one 
beneficiary of indirect tax relief – first, the taxable person and second, the final 
consumer.
242
 However, the wording in Article 107(1) TFEU clearly provides that state aid 
consist of an advantage conferred on undertakings. Let us call this the dilemma of defining 
the recipient. The first criterion of an advantage being conferred should therefore not be 
fulfilled, if no undertaking can be shown to be the recipient of the aid. 
To fully appreciate the legal argumentation of actual beneficiary of indirect tax relief, it is 
worthwhile to take a brief look into how indirect taxes are transferred to consumer prices 
according to empirical data. On a general level, environmental taxes may be purposefully 
constructed so as to bring tax advantages as close to the consumer as possible: Such a 
design has the most notable effect on consumption. On the other hand, the design is less 
effective when it comes to affecting producer behaviour.
243
 In Finland, empirical studies 
have shown that the degree to which indirect taxes are transferred to consumer prices 
varies significantly, and that as a starting point it can be assumed that about two thirds of 
the sum of an indirect tax is conveyed to the consumer prices.
244
 As a result, only one third 
of the effects of the tax measure would benefit the taxable person.
245
 By analogy, indirect 
tax relief would be less of an aid to undertakings than to consumers. 
                                                 
241
 Especially as regards VAT, fiscal neutrality, implying inter alia that the burden of VAT can be passed on 
to the community in its entirety without burdening the taxable person, is considered inherent in the tax 
system itself as well as one of the fundamental principles that the VAT system is based on (see Rosas 2009, 
277-278) 
242
 Englisch 2013, 12 
243
 Iire 2010, 272 
244
 See Martikainen – Virén 2006, 7 concerning excise taxes and Virén 2005, 8 concerning VAT. 
245
 It must be noted; however, that the results of the study on VAT referred to above was based on situations 
where the VAT rate had been increased, since that was the development of VAT rates at the time of 
conducting the research. The effect on prices might be more or less significant when it comes to a reduced 
VAT rate. 
40 
Moreover, reducing indirect taxes, for instance VAT, may have what could be called a 
’signalling effect’. This means that the publicity that a VAT reduction receives sends a 
positive signal to the consumers, who therefore change their consumption towards using 
the lower-rate product even where the price change in itself would not be significant 
enough to affect their behaviour.
246
 It would be logical to assume that reducing the tax rate 
of environmentally friendly products has this effect on consumption – both the potential 
price reduction and the generally acceptable aim might encourage consumers to buy the 
product. Most tax reductions are, however, directed at products not for their environmental 
purposes but to relieve them from the additional burden caused by environmental taxes. 
Such measures would not benefit from the goodwill effect of environmental aims, although 
the price effect would naturally remain.  
To sum up, the taxable undertaking can benefit from a tax reduction in two ways. First it 
can keep part of the tax reduction to itself. Second, it can benefit from consumers buying 
its products due to the free publicity received from the VAT reduction and the 
environmental objectives behind it. In addition, the effects that indirect taxes have on 
prices are also typically such that they increase over time. The immediate effects can be 
rather negligible, while on a long term prices might reflect the change in indirect tax more 
accurately.
247
 It therefore seems indisputable that undertakings receive at least some 
benefits from indirect tax reductions. 
5.1.2. Legal Interpretation of the Recipient of Aid 
The Commission has interpreted the dilemma of the recipient so that when an undertaking 
is required by law to transfer a tax benefit to its clients, that undertaking does not receive 
an advantage itself. Such measures will consequently escape being defined as State aid 
under Article 107(1) TFEU.
248
 However, an analogical interpretation of the recent GC case 
of Corsica Ferries would imply that even if the direct benefit of a tax measure is directed 
at employees (of a specific company), the measure does not necessarily escape the Article 
107(1) TFEU definition of State aid. Instead, the tax benefit can be considered as an 
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advantage conferred on the undertaking employing the recipients of aid.
249
 Indirect ways of 
transferring advantages to private persons instead of undertakings are thus sometimes 
caught by the notion of State aid, and at other times not. 
Owing to the aforementioned ambiguity in case law, I shall in the following examine 
whether the benefits of a preferential indirect tax scheme (concerning an environmental 
tax) can be argued to be conferred on consumers. Were that the case, indirect tax measures 
would fall entirely outside the scope of Article 107 TFEU. Such a conclusion could 
encourage Member States to adopt tax relief measures from indirect taxes in order to 
attract undertakings from other Member States. This, in turn, would be contrary to the 
objective of combatting harmful tax competition with State aid control. 
Firstly, the Environmental Aid Guidelines bring forward the possibility to pass on costs to 
consumers as an element which must be considered when assessing the compatibility 
exemptions and reductions from environmental taxes under Article 108(3)(c) TFEU. 
According to the guidelines said type of fiscal aid can be considered necessary only if it 
can be shown that environmental tax without reduction would lead to a substantial increase 
in production costs for the undertakings concerned, where those costs cannot be passed on 
to the consumer.
250
 Moreover, in the Consultation Paper regarding the modernisation of 
State aid the Commission has also recognised the difficulty of proving that tax relief has 
not been passed on as required by the Environmental Aid Guidelines.
251
  
Second, the above reasoning regarding the allocation of the advantage between the taxable 
person and the final consumer has been addressed indirectly by the ECJ. The cases 
concerned Member States’ duty to reimburse taxes that have been collected on false 
grounds or in excess.
252
 In its assessment, the ECJ has taken the view that first, not all 
taxes levied on a taxable person are necessarily transferred into the prices. Price elasticity 
and product substitutability are key factors in defining how much of a levy can actually be 
passed on. Furthermore, taking its evaluation to an even more realistic or economic level, 
the ECJ has also held that a tax measure may have an indirect effect on the taxable person, 
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regardless of the immediate tax burden being passed on to the consumer. For instance in 
Lady & Kid, the ECJ pointed out that even when fully encompassed in the consumer price, 
the taxable person may still suffer from an unjustly increased tax rate.
253
 In other words, 
even when passing on the entire immediate costs of a tax increase to consumers, the 
negative effects of having to increase prices might not be compensated by the increased 
revenues attained from higher prices.
254
 The costs of the higher tax rate therefore partly 
burdens the taxable person. By analogy, despite prices having been reduced in proportion 
with the tax relief, a preferential rate or an exemption from an indirect tax could imply an 
advantage for the taxed undertaking itself and instead of the final consumer. This in turn 
could be seen as a balancing out of advantages gained and advantages passed on. 
Taking all of the above elements into account when analysing the recipient of indirect tax 
relief renders the assessment State aid rather complicated. The ECJ has indicated that a 
more detailed assessment of the “passing on” of indirect taxes should be applied, however 
not in context of State aid.
255
 Such a detailed assessment would include an evaluation of (a) 
how much of the indirect tax relief has remained with the taxable person, and how much 
has been passed on to the final consumer, and (b) whether the taxable person has obtained 
indirect advantages in terms of e.g. goodwill or market share through the tax measure. 
Those indirect advantages may in turn have been accrued by virtue of the reduction 
consumer prices or the ‘signalling effect’ that tax reductions may have through publicity. 
Evidently, the same signalling effect can apply the other way around, so that an increased 
indirect tax or levy, especially in connection with outspoken environmental aims, may 
influence consumer behaviour significantly. The Irish levy on Plastic Bags provides for the 
textbook example of such an effect, as a 15 cent levy on plastic bags introduced in 2002 
led to a 90 % reduction in the use of plastic bags.
 256
 Whenever (a) and (b) amount in total 
to no aid remaining with the taxable person, no State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU would be granted. 
Drawing on the above interpretation, the assessment of possible costs having been passed 
on to consumers should be an economically oriented one. Surely, as the empirical studies 
referred to above have shown, it is true that changes in indirect tax rates affect both 
consumer prices and the revenue of undertakings. This would also be in line with the 
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objectives on environmental taxes, namely internalising environmental externalities in 
order to improve the environment. As passing on tax relief would exclude the definition of 
the measure as State aid, undertakings could be encouraged to pass on tax relief to full 
extent. However, a more negative consequence of introducing an economically oriented 
assessment of the recipient of indirect tax aid would be that it would add to the workload 
of the Commission. 
Undeniably, it does not seem reasonable from the point of view of the undertakings 
receiving an indirect fiscal benefit that fiscal aid would be determined at its nominal value, 
without due concern of a part of the advantages received having been passed on to the 
consumers.
257
 Such an approach may further discourage undertakings from taking indirect 
tax benefits into account in the prices of products in general. This in turn undermines the 
effect of indirect tax relief intended at reducing pollution, since the price would no longer 
reflect the indirect tax relief. Consequently such tax measures would no longer be capable 
of steering consumption towards products that are environmentally friendlier. The 
objective of incorporating environmental externalities would not be complete. Since it 
would in any case be difficult to prove that all of the indirect tax relief from the 
environmental aid has been passed on to consumers and that the overall incomes have not 
increased as a result, the condition of an advantage conferred to an undertaking would only 
rarely be escaped. 
5.2. Environmental Aid Granted by the State and Through its Resources 
5.2.1. Distinguishing between State aid and Union aid 
Since tax measures usually imply a form of tax expenditure from the state, also an 
environmental tax is presumed by definition to have been granted by the state.
258
 This 
presumption might however be rebutted if the aid is a direct consequence of EU policy. As 
such, this defence entails that where the aid derives from EU legislation, it is not per 
definition granted by the State, but rather by the EU. Concerning indirect environmental 
taxes, the influence of EU legislation is significant, since indirect taxes have been 
harmonised extensively in the EU. Following Englisch’ line of argumentation, the main 
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question to be asked is whether the tax measure in question can truly be imputable on the 
Member State, or if it directly from provisions of EU law.
259
 
In assessing the difference between State aid and Union aid, the Commission has applied a 
strict interpretation, according to which only aid which is specifically required by EU law 
can escape the scope of application of Article 107(1) TFEU. This approach was adopted in 
a case concerning Slovak tax advantages applied on electricity, coal and natural gas. The 
Commission pointed out that although the advantages in question were permissible under 
the harmonised EU provisions, they were not required by Union law. Therefore, the 
advantage was imputable on the Slovak state, fulfilling the second State aid criterion.
260
 In 
Puffer the ECJ confirmed that consequences of tax measures which are required by EU law 
do not amount to State intervention, and thus are not State aid.
261
 Moreover, in Mineral 
Oils the tax exemption from excise duty on mineral oils for alumina production was based 
on Council decisions, and could therefore not be interpreted as tax measures which were 
imputable on the individual Member State.
 262
 
Therefore, if the granting of a selective tax advantage is mandatory or expressly allowed 
under harmonised EU tax law, the effects cannot be attributed on the Member State.
263
 
When it comes to optional tax relief as provided by inter alia the VAT system, the Member 
States have to make an independent decision as to whether or not to adopt a certain 
measure. Such changes are often easily detectible in VAT-rate tables.
264
 Where an option 
to reduce a VAT rate is used, the GC has held that the measure can constitute state aid.
265
  
This conclusion is also supported by Directive 2003/96/EC, which specifically states that 
‘optional measures authorized by this Directive may still constitute State aid’.266 
Consequently, the possibilities of escaping State aid control by arguing that the aid is not 
imputable on the Member State but on the EU are limited. In a way this is regrettable since 
it might lead to Member States being less inclined to use options in the Directives in order 
                                                 
259
 Englisch 2013, 11 
260
 C (2009) 10745, SA.25172, Slovak Republic: Tax advantage applied on electricity, coal and natural gas, 
(NN 63/2009 ex. N 83/2008), 23 December 2009, para. 32 
261
 Case C-460/07 Puffer [2009] I-03251, 70-71 
262
 Joined cases T-50/06 RENV, T-56/06 RENV, T-60/06 RENV, T-62/06 RENV and T-69/06 RENV 
Mineral Oils, [2012], not yet reported, para. 94 
263
 Englisch 2013, 15. See also Kingston 2012, 391 
264
 Siikavirta 2007, 106 
265
 Case T-351/02 Deutsche Bahn [2006] ECR II-1047, para. 100 and joined cases T-50/06 RENV Mineral 
Oils [2012] (not yet reported), para. 73. 
266
 Council Directive 2003/96/EC, Article 26(2) 
45 
to go further in their environmental taxation than what has been achieved on an EU level. 
In addition, the options may provide for a possibility to fulfil one of the objectives of 
environmental taxes that is incentivising continuous improvement of the environment. 
Having achieved the level set in the Directive, Member States could move to more 
stringent environmental tax provisions allowed for in the optional provisions of the 
Directive. The strict interpretation of the distinction between State aid and Union aid 
requires that any such tightening of environmental taxes must be notified to the 
Commission. 
5.2.2. Privately Funded Aid and Concealed State Aid 
As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the second criterion of Article 107 TFEU requires 
that aid be financed either by the State, or by funds which are controlled by the State. This 
means that measures which channel support through private funding may in principle 
escape the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
267
 Therefore, a national provision according to 
which private undertakings must use environmentally friendly products and finance their 
production by paying more than the market price for them, is not necessarily in breach of 
Article 107 TFEU, even if it leads to a certain environmentally friendly product or industry 
being favoured.  
In order to avoid being defined as State aid, tax measures have often been separated from 
aid measure so as to exclude the criterion of “granted through state resources”. This is 
typical for energy tariff systems, which often include a tax or a levy intended to finance the 
tariff. What seems like a privately funded measure for the environment – paying a higher 
tariff for environmentally friendly energy – might be compensated by State resources in 
one way or another. Therefore, the distinction between privately financed environmental 
aid and publicly financed aid has been carefully scrutinised precisely in cases concerning 
energy tariffs.
268
 
Detecting aforementioned concealed State aids means applying the effects principle and 
not being bound to the form of the measure. Moreover, the measures must be considered in 
context and as a whole, since the aid itself is separated from its financing. In order to 
prevent circumvention of State aid control, the ECJ has adopted the following 
interpretation. If an aid measure which is allocated by private entities is compensated by 
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tax measures which are hypothecated to the aid – there is State aid. The aid measure 
becomes an integral part of the aid measure and should therefore itself be regarded as 
contrary to Article 107(1) TFEU.
269
 However, the State need not necessarily participate in 
the funding of an aid through typically stately interventions, such as compensatory tax 
measures, in order for an aid to be considered as State aid under Article 107 TFEU. 
Indirect forms of support to environmental tariff systems, for instance parafiscal charges 
levied on consumers, can lead to the measure in its entirety to be classified as State aid. 
This is demonstrated by the following cases. 
The frequently cited case PreussenElektra was a positive decision for those Member States 
wishing to pursue environmental policies by fiscal means without having to confront State 
aid control. In said case the ECJ made a distinction between what could be considered an 
indirect transfer of State resources and what could not. According to the judgment an 
indirect transfer of State resources does not encompass situations, where the state imposes 
an obligation on undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources at a fixed minimum price, since it includes no transfer of State resources. Instead, 
the aid originates from private resources, and should not be considered as State aid. 
270
 
The subsequent rulings introduced a more stringent interpretation of the difference 
between privately funded aid and notifiable State aid. The refined approach taken by the 
ECJ is understandable as a wide interpretation would allow for States to disguise aid 
measures as privately funded aid and consequently escape State aid control. In GEMO, the 
ECJ had already clarified that the subject of the tax measure and the aid measure does not 
have to be the same taxable person.
271
 In order for the condition of ‘state resources’ to be 
fulfilled in such a case, the tax measure must be hypothecated to the aid measure, so that it 
forms an integral part of the aid granted.
272
 Where taxation forms an integral part of a 
prohibited aid granted to an undertaking, also the tax measure itself should be considered 
illegitimate.
273
 Hypothecation means first, that the tax revenues necessarily be used for the 
financing of the aid in question. In other words, the tax measure, levy or parafiscal charge 
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must have been adopted for the financing of an aid measure.
274
 Second, it means that the 
revenue of the tax must have a direct impact on the amount of the aid.
275
 
Furthermore, in Essent, the ECJ narrowed the scope of application of its interpretation in 
PreussenElektra by concluding that even where the proceeds of a levy are entirely the 
possession of private entities, but where excess amount must be paid to the minister and 
were the proceeds are not to be used to other purposes than those provided for by law, the 
element of State aid control is sufficient to meet the criterion of state resources.
276
 A 
similar interpretation as that applied in Essent has since been adopted by the GC in another 
energy charge related case, Iride.
277
 In Iride, the element of State control was perhaps more 
evident, since the revenues of the contested electricity tariff were managed by a public 
fund.
278
 Hence, what seems like privately funded aid can in fact be identified as concealed 
State aid when connected to either compensatory tax measures for the taxable person or 
tariffs levied on the final consumer for the benefit of the taxable person.
279
 
In subsequent Commission decisions concerning tariff systems, the approach has been 
similar as in Essent and Iride, further narrowing down the scope of application of the 
interpretation in PreussenElektra. Almost any connection to public power seems to be 
interpreted as State control over the revenues. In a case concerning the Austrian feed-in 
tariff, the approach appeared particularly strict. The difference of the market price and 
fixed minimum price of renewable electricity was financed by a levy imposed on final 
consumers, which was collected and redistributed by a prima facie private “Eco-balance 
group”.280 The Commission assessed the criterion of State resources separately for the set 
minimum tariffs and the levy raised to compensate the difference between prices and 
tariffs. As to the levy imposed on consumers, it relied on the early case of Steinike & 
Weinlig.
281
 According to said case law the levy (i) must be imposed by the State; (ii) its 
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proceed must be poured into a body designated by the State (this body does not have to be 
State owned, not do the proceeds have to become the property of the State); (iii) the 
proceeds must be used to give an advantage to certain undertaking for it to constitute State 
resources.
282
 Moreover, the Commission regarded also the price-setting mechanism to 
constitute State aid. This conclusion was based on the fact that the representatives of the 
Eco-balance group were chosen from three high voltage grid operators, which were partly 
State owned. This, in the Commission’s assessment sufficed to fulfil the condition of State 
control as referred to above in Chapter 4.4.2.
283
  
However, as the ECJ has stated, even where an advantage is conferred through a public 
undertaking, it should not be taken for granted that the State has been the one making the 
decision.
284
 Therefore, I find the reasoning of the Commission somewhat insufficient in the 
case of the Austrian feed-in tariff system. At least a more thorough analysis of how the 
State controlled the resources through the representatives in the Eco-balance group could 
have enlightened the interpretation. It remains to be seen how different national 
adaptations of environmental tariff systems will be assessed by the ECJ in the future. 
Recently a number of Member States have in fact adopted feed-in tariff regimes for 
renewables which have been notified and approved following the Environmental Aid 
Guidelines. Those regimes have not been connected to tax measures, but to direct subsidies 
covering the difference between market prices and the set minimum tariffs.
285
 Pursuing 
environmental policy by tariff regimes seems to quite challenging unless submitting the 
measure to the Commission’s approval before implementing it. Because of this, it is 
tempting to draw the conclusion that imposing minimum tariffs combined with parafiscal 
levies on consumers instead of straight out tax measures is not a very elegant solution for 
pursuing environmental policy, at least not if one’s intention is to avoid State aid control.  
The PreussenElektra-case has only a very limited effect as excluding the notification 
requirement under Article 108(3) TFEU regarding tariff regimes. Implementing a system 
similar the one in PreussenElektra, could in my view escape notification duty only if no 
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levy is imposed on consumers neither by the State nor electricity buyers if they are State 
owned. Clearly, the consumers will in any case end up financing the tariffs at least to some 
degree, but to avoid being construed as granted through State resources, transferring the 
costs into prices should be left to the private undertakings. In light of the objective of 
simplifying regulations to reduce administrative costs, leaving the price issues to be dealt 
with by the private sector entirely without introducing complicated systems of transferring 
costs to consumers by State means could be a recommendable solution. That is, if the 
Member State prefers financing the tariffs by levies and parafiscal charges instead of direct 
public funding in the first place. 
5.2.3. The French Model – Financing Aid Measures with Taxes and Levies 
Several of the French environmental aids seem to be constructed in a similar way with the 
measures discussed above. Such taxes are constructed so that the allocation of aid and the 
tax measure are two separate measures connected to each other by different mechanisms. 
These types of measures have been referred to as ‘closed systems’ of environmental tax 
aid, and their effectiveness has been considered to be better than that of other fiscal aids for 
the environment.
286
 Therefore an examination of the acceptability of the French model is 
worth examining. 
A successful example of a ‘closed system’ which was considered not to constitute fiscal 
state aid is that of case Doux Élevage. The case concerned a levy, which is collected from 
turkey farmers and producers and redistributed to finance the mutual costs by an inter-trade 
group consisting of trade organisations in the agricultural industry, without interference of 
state revenues.
287
 However, the levy which had been agreed upon within the inter-trade 
group was extended to apply by law to all traders within the industry and not only those 
who were parties to the inter-trade group contract. The ECJ concluded that despite the 
legal obligation to finance the services provided by the inter-trade group, the state budget 
was not involved and the aid therefore remained private to its nature. Article 107(1) TFEU 
was therefore not applicable on the arrangement.
288
 
Not all similar models of closed systems of environmental fiscal aid have, however, passed 
the test of “granted through State resources”. Before 2001, the French system for aiding 
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farmers and slaughterhouses dispose of animal carcasses (which are classified as hazardous 
waste) was constructed so that retailers were obliged by law to pay a certain levy on meat 
products, while the revenues of that tax were allocated to private carcass disposal services 
via a fund. Animal carcasses exceeding a certain weight as well as all carcasses from 
slaughterhouses were to be disposed of by means of the service pursuant to the legislation. 
The service was free of charge, which already implies that the PPP and the objective of 
internalising environmental costs are not adhered to. The system suffered a major setback 
when the ECJ concluded in its decision in 2003 that the tax amounted to State aid to 
farmers and slaughterhouses under Article 107(1) TFEU.
289
 The ruling built on the fact that 
although it was the retailers who paid the tax and the slaughterhouses that benefitted from 
the animal waste service, the aid was granted through the State since the animal waste 
services were financed by a fund to which the retailers taxes on meat products were 
allocated. Moreover, the animal waste service providers through had concluded contracts 
with the departmental prefects.
290
 
Pursuant to the decision, the legislation was changed in order to comply with EU law, and 
was followed by several national administrative procedures where retailers were 
reimbursed the unlawfully levied taxes.
291
 The system has since been reconstructed so as to 
exclude any intervention of state resources in order to comply with the logic of the case 
PreussenElektra and subsequent case law. The current tax on meat products is thus not 
directed at a specific fund but is now allocated to the general State budget, whereby the 
hypothecation and connection with the aid has been discontinued. The criticism that certain 
scholars have pointed at in relation to the PreussenElektra –case implies that said case 
encourages Member States to adopt measures with similar effects as aid schemes, but by 
excluding state resources so as to circumvent the application of Article 107(1) TFEU. The 
fact that the French legislator amended the meat taxation scheme in the aforementioned 
way is, in my opinion, an example that backs up such criticism.
292
 
In light of more recent case law, namely the aforementioned case Essent, the non-
application of Article 107(1) TFEU on the current French tax on meat products can, in my 
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opinion, be questioned. In Essent the measure was considered as imputable on the State 
precisely because a levy was charged from the consumer – much like how an indirect tax 
would be applied. Therefore, it would seem as a formalistic approach instead of one which 
focuses on the effects of a measure, if the tax on meat products could no longer be 
considered as State aid, only because they pass through the general budget and not a 
specific fund. 
The Essent case prompted the French Conseil d’État to question two decisions concerning 
the French tariff system for wind power. The case Vent de Colère is currently suspended in 
the Conseil d’État, as it has referred a preliminary question on the subject of State aid to 
the ECJ.
293
 The case concerns the obligation on private electricity providers (ÉDF 
included) to purchase all electricity produced by renewable sources at a higher than market 
price, set by a Decree of the Ministry of Economy and Energy. The costs incurred by that 
obligation are compensated by a public fund, which collects its resources from a tax 
imposed on electricity producers, providers and distributors.
294
 In 2003, the Conseil d’État 
had already once approved of the measure and opined in line with PreussenElektra that 
since the measure was not financed by the State. However, by 2008 the Decrees had been 
amended so that the surcharge of the obligation to buy all renewable energy at a fixed price 
was no longer financed by a specific fund, but by a specific levy on the final consumers of 
electricity. The structure of the measure is thus nearly identical with that of Essent, only 
the objective is different, as in Vent de Colère the system specifically justified by 
environmental objectives. Following the above reasoning as well as the recent opinion of 
AG Jääskinen, I find that the most likely scenario is that the ECJ will deem the wind power 
tariff regime to fulfil the criterion of aid being granted through state resources.
295
 
Finally, the issue of distinguishing privately funded aid from State aid was recently 
addressed in the Court of administrative appeals of Lyon concerning a case on an 
environmental aid to sustainable fishery, where the aid measure was once again financed 
through a separate levy.
296
 However, the levy is not, according to the Court of 
administrative appeals of Lyon, hypothecated to the aid measure, but paid to the general 
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budget, and therefore not State aid.
297
 Moreover, the Commission had not raised objections 
against the measure in its decision in 2008.
298
 
All of the aforementioned issues are built on systems where the person under the 
environmental obligation is not the taxable person. The scheme is a typically French way 
of constructing fiscal environmental incentives. The French Government has also brought 
this up in their answer to the Commission’s public consultation on the Environmental Aid 
Guidelines.
299
 In its answer the French Government emphasised the benefits of closed 
systems of taxing and then aiding a certain sector with the proceeds of the tax. The 
reimbursement in the form of an aid would not be redistributed in proportion to 
environmental harm or pollution. Instead the distribution could be based on the objective 
of competitiveness, for instance. The French Government argued that in such a way, the 
incentivising effect as well as the signalling effect of an environmental tax are maintained 
while the tax itself remains ‘environmental’ to its nature and does not include exemptions 
amounting to harmful subsidies.
300
 
I find the arguments of the French Government are rather convincing, as they coincide 
what has been suggested as effective ways of adopting environmental taxes. Where the 
proceeds of a tax are directed at a specific environmental activity, the financing measure 
becomes transparent in the sense that both the public and the polluters are aware of how 
the proceeds of the tax are used. In the eyes of tax payers and consumers, such taxes can 
seem more legitimate.
301
 Moreover, such a system may help maintain competitiveness of 
the sector being taxed, one of objectives of environmental taxes. On the other hand, the 
mere imposition of an incentivising tax without directing the proceeds to be used for any 
particular purpose does perhaps fall more in the logic of the PPP and the objective of 
internalising environmental costs into prices. By this I mean that if a tax is levied on an 
environmentally harmful product, the use of such product should be reduced as a 
consequence of the higher price. Consequently, the need for funding in order to combat the 
environmental problems related to the product would be reduced as well.
302
 Therefore, 
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there would be no interest in directing the decreasing tax revenues of the environmental tax 
to combatting the environmental problem, as the problem itself should be solved by the 
price increase. Such conclusion is, however, less convincing in practical terms. Levying 
taxes on certain environmentally harmful products without directing them back to combat 
the initial environmental problem can lead to unwanted side effects, such as consumers 
crossing borders to buy non-taxed products. This would not be coherent with the objective 
of protecting the environment – environmental harm would only cross borders to the next 
Member State. Neither would it be desirable considering the combating of harmful tax 
competition, as Member States might be compelled to not introduce environmental taxes in 
order to receive consumers from neighbouring Member States. 
5.3. Selectivity and Environmental Considerations in Taxation  
5.3.1. Varying Natural Conditions and Regional Environmental Taxes 
Although selectivity can also result from the geographical limitations of a tax measure,
303
 
regional authorities may adopt differing tax measures under the conditions discussed in 
Chapter 4.5.2 without it amounting to State aid. As the natural environments can vary 
significantly from one region to another even within one Member State, and given that 
some Member States have delegated environmental taxation powers to regional 
authorities,
304
 it is quite conceivable that the defence of ‘regional tax’ would be used 
particularly in cases concerning environmental taxation. Moreover, some pollutants, so 
called non-uniformly mixed pollutants, are specifically connected to their region so that 
their impact is different depending on the place of emission. In such cases regional 
differentiation of environmental taxes is particularly justifiable.
305
 Decentralising 
environmental taxation powers to regional authorities also seems legitimate as it would 
allow the authorities to profit from local knowledge about the region’s environmental 
conditions when determining tax rates and measures. 
To shortly reiterate the defence of regional taxes, it entails that a sufficiently autonomous 
region can apply its own tax measures whereby the frame of reference in the selectivity-
test must be confined to the region and not the entire Member State. Put in other terms, a 
measure can be regionally general, whereas it would be selective if assessed in the context 
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of the entire Member State.
306
 The ECJ has defined sufficient regional autonomy as 
consisting of three dimensions of autonomy which must all be present - institutional, 
procedural and economic autonomy.
307
  
In my reading, the ECJs assessment of these three dimensions includes no mentioning of 
whether or not the autonomy of the region is to be determined based on its autonomy as 
regards each measure separately, or the autonomy of the regional as a whole. The 
relevance of this distinction for environmental taxes is that a region might be given more 
extensive powers and autonomy in relation to its environmental policy, whereas other 
policies would be to a larger scale financed and governed by the central authorities. In my 
opinion, it would seem an unnecessarily strict approach to environmental taxation to 
require that the region must be sufficiently autonomous in general and not only when it 
comes to defining environmental taxes. This line of argumentation seems to be consistent 
with that of Micheau, who points out that ‘what matters in tax matters is the autonomy 
enjoyed by the region to confer the tax regardless of other economic or political 
considerations’.308 Concerning economic autonomy, the ECJ seems to have applied this 
approach, as the autonomy test does not require than no financial connections exist 
between the region and the State.
309
 Instead, the ECJ has emphasised that economic 
autonomy would requires that potential losses incurred by the region due to its own 
implementation of the tax regime would not be reimbursed by the state.
310
 In the case of 
UGT-Rioja concerning the regional autonomy of the Basque Country, the ECJ underlined 
that any financial transfers between the State and the region would not per se exclude 
economic autonomy, but that the compensation should be specifically directed at the tax 
losses incurred.
311
 The State can continue to support the region economically, as long as 
there is no causal connection between the amounts transferred and the losses incurred by 
the region. 
The above reasoning would also seem reasonable when considering the ECJs and the 
Commission’s capacity to assess constitutional relationships between regions and central 
governments. A more limited approach, where autonomy is assessed only in relation to 
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environmental policy would seem to be less intrusive on the Member States’ constitutional 
law. However, in the Azores –case the ECJ assessed concepts of Portuguese constitutional 
law. It specifically pointed at the local authority adopting the taxing having to have a 
separate political and administrative status from a constitutional point of view in order to 
meet the condition of institutional autonomy.
312
  
Moreover, in the assessment of the regime in the Azores, the ECJ referred to ‘national 
solidarity’, a general constitutional principle in Portugal, as one of the factors taken into 
account when assessing the autonomy of the region. The ECJ referred to the Portuguese 
legislation according to which the principle entails inter alia that the central State 
contributes, together with the regional authorities, to the correction of inequalities deriving 
from remoteness of the region.
313
 On the contrary, there was no mentioning of the 
contested tax measure being reimbursable by the state, as the ECJ confined itself to 
pointing out that the Portuguese Government had not demonstrated that State financing 
was not going to be used to cover for the reduced tax revenues resulting from the tax 
measure adopted by the Azores authorities.
314
 Such argumentation could imply that the 
constitutional status of a region must meet the conditions of autonomy on a general level 
and not only in relation to a certain tax measure. This approach taken by the ECJ would 
seem rather formalistic, and in addition it is can be perceived as intruding into Member 
States’ constitutional orders, in contrast with the obligation to respect Member States 
constitutions as set out in Article 4(2) TEU.
315
 
Naturally, one could argue that unless interpreted strictly, regions may be delegated with 
the right to impose indirect environmental taxes specifically in order to circumvent the 
application of Article 107(1) TFEU. As opined by Advocate General Geelhoed, Member 
States may be inclined to give formal autonomy to regions, while retaining actual power. 
Assessing geographical selectivity based on formal autonomy would be in contrast with the 
prevailing effect principle in State aid control.
316
 A far reaching differentiation of 
environmental taxes between different regions could also lead to further difficulties in 
pursuing common European environmental goals as well as intensified environmental tax 
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competition. However, I find it questionable how realistic such development would be 
when it would presuppose that Member States make significant changes to their 
constitutional systems governing regional autonomy. Certain areas are already autonomous 
enough to fulfil the criteria, and given the local nature of environmental questions, I find 
that a light loosening up of the regional autonomy criterion would be welcome. 
Some systems of regional variation of taxes are not considered as State aid despite the 
regions being economically dependent on the central government, and thus not 
autonomous. An example of this it the Italian landfill tax, which is determined at a regional 
level. Each region applies its own system of tariffs based on different variables such as 
whether the waste has been pre-treated and whether the recycling targets have been met, 
while nevertheless adhering to nationally defined targets, bans and restrictions.
317
 The 
regional authorities have specifically been designated the task of forming their own waste 
tax regime, albeit within the margins and targets set on a national level. Since all regions 
define their own tax rates, the devolution of tax powers regarding environmental taxes is 
symmetrical. Some undertakings will benefit from being established in a certain region, but 
that does not necessarily mean that they are conferred an advantage in the sense of Article 
107(1) TFEU.
318
 This is in line with the situation described by the ECJ, where the 
allocation of taxation powers corresponds to a model for distribution of tax competences in 
which all the local authorities at the same level have the autonomous power to decide the 
tax rate applicable within their territory, albeit within limits set at a national level. The ECJ 
stated that such a situation would not be selective because no ‘normal’ rate could be 
established as a frame of reference.
319
 Member States’ systems of parallel regional tax 
competences are thereby not selective and thus not at variance with State aid control.
320
 
However, as to asymmetrical devolution of taxation powers selectivity, selectivity is easily 
fulfilled. For instance, in Finland the landfill tax is determined separately for the Åland 
Islands and for the rest of the country. It is not self-evident whether the requirements for 
regional autonomy as established by the ECJ in the Azores case – institutional, procedural 
and economic autonomy, can be fulfilled when the regional powers are differentiated 
asymmetrically for only or a few regions. As regards the idea of varied natural conditions 
being the basis for allocating environmental taxation powers to certain regions, it would be 
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reasonable to accept also asymmetrical systems for regional environmental taxation. 
Institutional autonomy is perhaps the clearest conditions, By analogy of the ECJ’s 
interpretation in Gibraltar, the fact that a certain region would have the power to set its 
own rates on environmental taxes within limits set at a national level should not amount to 
selectivity only because they depart from the taxes in the rest of the Member State.  
An important difference between Gibraltar as well as Azores and environmental taxes is, 
however, the cases concerned direct taxation. As direct taxation falls within the sole 
competence of Member States, it is perhaps more natural to allow for Member States to 
decide upon the devolution of tax powers in that situation than when it comes to indirect 
taxes, such as environmental taxes. This observation is particularly relevant when it comes 
to the assessment of procedural autonomy, entailing that central government should be able 
to intervene directly as regards the context of a tax proposal. In Gibraltar, the condition 
was considered to be fulfilled since company taxation fell within Gibraltar’s competence.  
Moreover, the UK had never in reality made use of its existing constitutional powers to 
intervene directly into Gibraltar’s policy decisions in matters relating to ‘financial and 
economic stability’, a notion which would seem to include taxation.321 Procedural 
autonomy regarding indirect taxes is somewhat less apparent. In the field of indirect taxes 
the competence is shared between Member States and the EU and new rules or regulations 
concerning indirect environmental taxes on an EU level cannot be departed from at a 
regional level. One could view this as meaning that ‘direct intervention’ into a region’s tax 
policy on indirect environmental taxes is possible by definition, whereby the condition of 
procedural autonomy may not be fulfilled. This, of course, is not the case for the Finnish 
Åland Islands or Gibraltar for that matter, since they are both excluded from the fiscal 
territory of the EU.
322
 
5.3.2. Can Environmental Objectives be Inherent to the Tax System? 
Apart from geographic selectivity, an environmental tax can naturally be materially 
selective. A national environmental tax measure which favours certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective 
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pursued by the tax, are in a comparable factual and legal situation is considered 
selective.
323
 Moreover, as an exception to the aforementioned definition, a tax measure 
shall nevertheless not be considered selective, if it is inherent to the tax system and 
therefore passes the system test. The system test entails that the tax measure adheres to the 
general tax system in the Member State and is a direct consequence thereof. The 
assessment of material selectivity and it’s possible justification through the system test is 
somewhat different when it comes to  
a) national tax measures which aim at environmental protection, than when it comes to 
b) derogatory tax measures which are introduced to reduce environmental taxes in order to 
achieve other objectives, may they be related to competitiveness, social concerns or 
something else. 
First, a distinction between two types of justifications should be made. It has been pointed 
out by scholars that justifications which are acceptable under the system test, so called 
internal justifications, are different from policy-related justifications, which are external to 
their nature.
324
 Therefore, there is a distinct difference between the nature of the tax system 
on the one hand, and the specific environmental objectives of a tax measure on the other. It 
has further been held that only the previous kind of justifications such as for instance 
progressivity of a tax can justify a selective measure, or rather; render a measure 
‘unselective’ so as to escape Article 107 entirely. This interpretation is most relevant when 
assessing tax measures belonging to group a) referred to above, that is, tax measures 
intended to reduce environmental harm. According to this view, external justifications such 
as environmental objectives should not be taken into account as justification. Such 
interpretation is in line with the wording used by the ECJ’s in British Aggregates. In said 
case the ECJ stated that environmental objectives are taken into account to sufficient extent 
under Article 107(3) TFEU, whereby consideration under Article 107(1) TFEU is 
unnecessary.
325
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Of course, one could imagine that environmental concerns are so integrated in the national 
tax system that are guiding principles of that system in the same way that progressivity, for 
instance. In that case, the environmental justification would be “internal” and therefore 
pass the system test. However, since very few or no Member States could argue that 
environmental objectives are inherent in the nature of their tax system,
326
 one must ask 
whether it is possible at all to introduce environmental taxes without them being 
considered selective. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ has not been consistent as to the above assessment of selectivity. 
The Commission and the ECJ have occasionally departed from the view expressed in 
British Aggregates and assessed selectivity specifically in light of the pronounced 
objectives of the national law. This approach is coherent with the definition of State aid 
referred to above, where different treatment of undertakings in the same situation should be 
assessed ‘in light of the objective pursued’ – e.g. environmental objectives. The ECJ’s 
approach has been interpreted as permissive as regards taxes which conform strictly to the 
PPP.
327
  
This approach to selectivity is particularly relevant when it comes to derogatory tax 
measures under group b) that is derogations from environmental taxes on the basis of other 
than environmental objectives. There is, however, still uncertainty as to whether the 
objectives pursued by the tax in question should have an impact on the assessment material 
selectivity or not. Even the Commission does not seem certain of whether it should be 
taking environmental objectives into account when assessing selectivity of tax measures. 
For instance, in a decision concerning a Dutch zero-rate of energy tax on renewables, the 
Commission first stated that the tax measure did not constitute aid, since it was in line with 
the environmental objective of the tax. However, the Commission stated that in the 
alternative, the tax would in any way be permissible under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.
328
 In a 
subsequent State aid case, the Commission relied strictly on the ECJ’s wording in previous 
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case law
329
 and held that subjective aims of the national legislator have no bearing in the 
selectivity test.
330
 
Assessing selectivity and justifications in light of the objective pursued would allow for a 
more convenient approach to Member States wishing to pursue national environmental 
policies by means of taxes. However, if taking national environmental objectives into 
account in the assessment of selectivity, one must be aware of the fact that the outspoken 
objectives might not be the same ones as the actual objectives. An outspokenly 
environmental tax measure might in fact be designed to conceal State aid. On the other 
hand, when a tax measure applies incoherently as regards its objective, for instance so that 
it treats foreign polluters worse than domestic polluters, it can be rather straightforward to 
identify that the measure is selective. In such a case the effects of the measure are not in 
line with its alleged objectives, whereby the measure can be deemed selective.
331
 In its 
decision concerning an exemption from passenger tax on airlines in transit, the 
Commission noted that despite the tax being labelled as having environmental aims, the 
actual objective was fiscal. Consequently, the selectivity test was applied in light of the 
fiscal aims of the tax.
332
 
Nevertheless, arguing that environmental objectives should never be taken into 
consideration when assessing selectivity is consistent with the argument of selectivity 
being as little about the objectives of a tax as it is about the form in which the tax is 
imposed. Instead, as mentioned repeatedly by the ECJ, the effects of a measure should 
determine how it is perceived in the selectivity test.
333
 Moreover, as stated by the ECJ, 
environmental concerns may, in any event, be taken into account as to the permissibility of 
the State aid measure pursuant to Article 107(3) TFEU.
334
 On the other hand, it seems that 
restricting the Member States from adopting new tax policies without notification, notably 
such that involve environmental concerns, is quite a considerable restriction of the fiscal 
sovereignty of the Member States. As mentioned earlier, the exceptions awarded by virtue 
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of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the Environmental Aid Guidelines are limited as to their 
material and temporal scope.  
Therefore, I find that external environmental justifications should be taken into account in 
the assessment of selectivity. This conclusion is backed up by Advocate General 
Geeldhoe’s opinion in GIL Insurance. where he gave an example concerning a selective 
tax on environmentally friendly cars, saying that where State aid control would require that 
taxation for environmentally friendly cars was brought up to the level of the taxation of 
environmentally unfriendly cars, the Member States would be deprived of a policy 
instrument used to pursue a fully legitimate objective, which would in essence ‘remove 
from the Member State concerned competences conferred on it by the Treaty’.335 Naturally, 
such tax measure could probably be allowed of notified to the Commission, but as will be 
shown in Chapter 5.5, creating an environmental tax which adheres to the Environmental 
Aid Guidelines is not uncomplicated. 
5.3.3. Justified Derogations from Environmental Taxes 
Following the aforementioned approach to selectivity where external objectives such as 
improving the environment are not taken into account, derogations from environmental 
taxes can still escape State aid control due to internal justifications. Internal justifications 
are justifications which pass the system test. According to the test, tax measures which 
derive from the nature of the tax system in question are justified and not selective.
336
 
Therefore, guiding principles such as ability to pay can justify derogations from 
environmental taxes, which would otherwise be construed as selective. 
A guiding principle that has been approved as being inherent in the nature of the tax 
system is progressivity of income tax.
337
 By contrast, the regressive nature of a tax has 
been held as an indication of selectivity. This is unlikely to apply for environmental taxes, 
seen that they mainly consist of indirect taxes which are typically regressive to their 
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nature.
338
 The regressive nature of a tax might therefore be considered “inherent in the 
system” when it comes to indirect environmental taxes.  
Moreover, the ECJ’s ruling in Gibraltar also suggest that the principle of ability to pay 
could be accepted as a guiding principle as long as it is applied consistently, which the ECJ 
held not to be true in that particular case.
339
 According to this line of interpretation, a 
Member State applying a reduced tax rate of an environmental tax on undertakings with 
lower ability to pay would not qualify for State aid, provided that ability to pay is inherent 
in the national tax system as a guiding principle. At a first reading this does perhaps not 
seem strange at all. However, when considering the eventuality where the undertakings 
being more leniently taxed cause more environmental harm than those being heavily taxed, 
the results of such tax becomes rather dubious in light to the overall objectives of both 
State aid control and environmental taxation. The tax does not consist of internalising 
environmental costs into prices, nor does it necessarily promote competitiveness. In fact, 
the result seems to contradict the general national aim of the tax itself, being the protection 
of the environment. The same logic has been expressed by Advocate General Kokott, 
stating that it would be inconsistent with the PPP to exempt certain groups from costs 
incurred by the environmental pollution they cause on the ground of poverty or reduced 
ability to pay.
340
 On the other hand, as is correctly pointed out by Kingston, at least the 
Member States’ power to decide upon national tax policies is respected when allowing 
guiding principle of the national tax systems to escape the definition of prohibited State 
aid.
341
 
The ECJs interpretation of the system test has been strict, which is true also for cases of aid 
relating to environmental taxes.
342
 The strict approach was present in the frequently cited 
case Adria-Wien, which concerned a rebate scheme from electricity and natural gas 
taxation for manufacturing undertakings, as it was considered that the manufacturing 
industry would be particularly harmed by high energy taxation. ECJ kept to a strict 
interpretation of the selectivity by concluding, inter alia, that there was no evidence to 
determine that the industry benefitting from the rebate in question would suffer more from 
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the energy tax than other industries, whereby the tax was considered selective, although 
being applied similarly to all manufacturing undertakings.
343
 In other words, the industries 
were in a comparable legal and factual situation with regard to the harm caused to the 
environment by the consumption of electricity and natural gas, whereby applying the 
rebate scheme to only one category of industry amounted to selectivity. The tax measure 
could therefore not be traced back to any guiding principle of national tax law. Whether 
there was a national principle according to which manufacturing industry was to be taxed 
differently from other industries was not addressed.  
The ECJ’s strict interpretation of system was reiterated in British Aggregates,344 where the 
ECJ further narrowed the margin of discretion of Member States wishing to introduce a tax 
measure justified by environmental concerns. The case concerned a levy on virgin 
aggregates such as gravel and sand, but included a number of exemptions which were not, 
according to the ECJ, justifiable in neutral terms in relation to the intended environmental 
objective. In contrast to what the GC
345
 and the Commission
346
 had stated, the ECJ 
concluded that the tax measure was not general but selective since it did not apply 
similarly to all aggregate industry activities with equivalent environmental effects.
347
 The 
national conception of what is good for the environment does not seem to have any 
relevance. Instead, the assessment of environmental effects is conducted by the ECJ. By 
generalising this conclusion one must interpret the connection between State aid and 
environmental taxes as a very delicate one, where all effects of different methods should be 
taken into account in order to apply similar tax rules on activities with equivalent effects. 
In other words, environmental levies must be constructed so that they are consistently 
environmentally friendly. Taking into consideration the fast evolvement of environmental 
technologies and the knowledge of the effects thereof, this could prove to be challenging 
for the Member States attempting to introduce environmental tax schemes.  
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Moreover, the interpretation adopted by the ECJ might have an impact on Member State’s 
willingness to pursue environmental goals through taxation. As pointed out by Kingston 
the ECJ’s view on environmental taxes under 107 TFEU can be seen as permitting the ECJ 
to ‘second-guess member States’ choices as to how they wish to prioritise the reduction of 
polluting activities’.348 The same concern has been expressed by Lang in relation to the 
supposed change in the ECJ‘s application of the selectivity criteria in Gibraltar as well as 
in British Aggregates. According to Lang, the ECJ’s approach may have ‘important 
implications e.g. for taxes intended to discourage pollution’,349 mainly consisting of 
Member States having to construct their environmental taxation so that all activities 
causing equally polluting effects also bear an equal tax burden. Different ecological 
methods would thus have to be taxed similarly, whenever the impact they have on the 
environment is the same, a requirement referred to as technological neutrality.
350
 Creating 
said type of a technologically neutral environmental tax is not an easy task to impose on 
Member States. 
5.3.4. Towards an Objectives-Based Approach on Selectivity 
The above discussion proves that assessing selectivity without taking into account the 
objective of the tax measure – particularly in environmental cases – can lead to results 
which are neither in line with the environmental objectives of the EU, nor with the powers 
to tax that Member States have according to the Treaty. However, the previous strict 
approach to selectivity, making no exceptions due to environmental aims of a tax measure, 
has been loosened up in recent judgements, at least according to a number of scholars.
351
 
The wording of the GC in British Aggregates which had been returned to it by the ECJ 
certainly supports such a conclusion, stating that environmental objectives of the British 
aggregates levy could not be disregarded in the assessment of the similarity of legal and 
factual situations. Instead, selectivity was to be assessed in light of the distinct principles 
and objectives within the field of taxes in question.
352
 
Micheau
353
 has integrated the external objectives of a tax into the system test, so that the 
tax measure is first assessed against the external objectives, and then based on adherence to 
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the general taxation scheme of the Member State. A similar model for assessing selectivity 
is proposed by Nicolaides and Rusu.
354
 An objectives-based approach to selectivity would 
approach the rule of reason-doctrine of established in relation to free movement of 
goods.
355
 By analogy, one could argue that if the objectives approach were adopted, 
national tax measures should also be subjected to the proportionality-test in the assessment 
of selectivity. Environmental objectives could be taken into account when assessing 
selectivity of a tax, but the objective would have to be acceptable, adequate and not go 
further than what is necessary to attain the objective pursued. Bartosch describes the 
objectives-based approach as three stages in the assessment of the criterion of material 
selectivity: 
(1) Identifying the reference framework 
(2) Identifying the objectives pursued by the measure, and assessing their permissibility 
under State aid control 
(3) Applying the system test, as in verifying that the measure together with its objectives is 
justified by the nature of the reference framework.
356
 
The recent case of Paint Graphos indicated that the national court was, in fact, to consider 
the proportionality of the tax reduction in question when assessing whether the measure 
was justifiable under the system test.
357
 However, there is in principle no distinct legal 
basis for introducing a proportionality-test into State aid control under Article 107(1) 
TFEU. The wording of the article states that any aid should be considered incompatible 
with the internal market. Less dramatic applications of the rule of reason-doctrine have, 
however, found their way into State aid control. For instance the adoption of the de 
minimis-regulation has been considered to mitigate the strictness of the interpretation of 
Article 107(1) TEEU as it permits for aid measures which fall below the threshold values 
set in the regulation without notification. In that way it is an expression of the rule of 
reason-approach.
358
 
In my opinion, the objectives-based approach could be welcome change in the 
interpretation of selectivity. The objectives of internalising environmental costs and 
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allowing for sustainable growth while maintaining competitiveness could be reached if 
Member States had more possibilities to adopt national environmental taxes without the 
burden of notifying the measure. Moreover, the risk of distorting competition, or having 
Member States introduce protectionism measures would be reduced by requiring that the 
measures pass the proportionality-test. Many of the more recent cases relating to State aid 
and taxation which have already be decided upon would in my interpretation de facto result 
in a similar conclusion if applying an interpretation in line with the objectives-based 
approach. However, the Member States would be better equipped to pursue environmental 
policy by fiscal means since they would no longer be bound by the ‘system test’ as the only 
possible defence from selectivity, but could invoke environmental objectives as long as 
those were applied in coherence with the national taxation scheme. Otherwise, national tax 
policy could only pursue general tax principles, such as progressivity or ability to pay, 
without notifying the aid to the Commission.
359
 Such an approach would not further 
Commission’s efforts to promote the adoption of national environmental taxes as market 
based instruments. 
5.4. Liability to Distort Competition and Effect on Interstate Trade  
5.4.1. Aiding Local Environment – No Competition in Sight 
The last criterion to be assessed is that of liability to distort competition and effect on 
interstate trade, as discussed in Chapter 3.5. Limited aid to local service can in principle 
escape this criterion.
360
 With the exception of measures which fall within the scope of the 
de minimis-regulation, the Commission has only rarely concluded that a measure would 
not be liable to distort competition nor affect interstate trade. Out of those measures none 
have been fiscal or related to environmental concerns.
361
  
Instead, the aid measures which have not, according to the Commission, amounted to State 
aid, have been SGEI services related to local projects which faced no competition. In 
comparison, limited tax exemptions on specific local environmental grounds could at least 
in principle not affect competition, and therefore be acceptable under Article 107(1) TFEU. 
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In Finland one could argue that the fact that peat and pine oil are not subjected to a 
strategic stockpile fee
362
 is an aid which does not have an effect on Member State trade due 
to the scarcity of those particular raw materials elsewhere in Europe, whereby competition 
within that field is non-existent. Moreover, as has been expressed by Advocate General 
Jacobs, small amounts of aid to sectors operating on local markets such as car repairs, taxi 
services or sectors with prohibitive transport costs might not be liable to affect trade 
between Member States.
363
 Thus, there might be a possibility of introducing or reducing 
levies on a local level. 
The registration tax for passenger cars in Finland, which is normally based on CO2 
emissions registered for the car model provides for a practical example in this context.
 364
 
The registration tax includes a derogation for passenger cars used in taxi services, for 
which the tax payable is reduced.
365
 According to the reasoning of Jacobs, the reduction for 
taxis could be considered as not having an effect on Member State trade, whereby it would 
not constitute State aid. Having said that, minor effects on trade between Member States 
could, however, be produced in bordering regions to other Member States, where it might 
be profitable to register taxi cars on one side of the border despite providing the taxi 
services mainly on the other side of the border. Whether or not minor and rather unlikely 
effects on trade like the one described here could be considered as fulfilling the criterion is 
not entirely clear from the Commissions practice. To my knowledge the exemption has not 
been notified to the Commission. 
5.4.2. Does Taxing at the Destination Exclude Effects on Interstate Trade? 
One of the most important environmental taxes is the VAT, which is harmonised 
throughout the EU, but which allows for member States to diversify the rate applied.
366
 
Despite that, the compatibility of national VAT measures with the rules concerning state 
aid have been examined only very rarely by the ECJ, and a VAT measure has been deemed 
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to constitute State aid only once.
367
 The same can be said about excise taxes, with the 
exception of the frequently cited case Adria-Wien, which concerned an energy tax rebate 
system for undertakings in the manufacturing business.
368
 The question of whether reduced 
VAT or excise can be liable to distort competition in the meaning of Article 107(1) has 
thus not yet been thoroughly evaluated by the ECJ. 
As to tax relief on taxes such as the VAT and excises, which are based on the destination 
principle where the tax is collected at the place of the consumer, it is questionable whether 
trade between Member States would be affected in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU at 
all. As has been mentioned earlier, the criterion of liability to distort competition and affect 
interstate trade is normally easy to fulfil, even in tax cases, the vast majority naturally 
being cases concerning direct taxation. In relation to direct taxes, it has been established 
that even tax relief which is available for all national undertakings within the relevant 
market must be prohibited if the national undertakings compete with undertakings from 
other Member States.
369
 This is because such tax relief would discourage non-national 
undertakings from exporting their products to the Member State applying the tax relief.
370
  
However, since VAT and excises are normally levied in the destination state, foreign 
undertakings will not be discouraged from exporting their products to the Member State 
applying a higher VAT or excise on the products in question. Consequently, whereas 
indirect taxes following the destination principle are concerned, liability to distort 
competition and interstate trade is logically present only when there are other substitutable 
products available, which do not benefit from the tax relief. This reasoning has been relied 
on by the Commission in cases concerning excise duties on biofuels. Since biofuels serve 
as a substitute for fossil diesel and petrol, tax exemptions and reductions for biofuels are 
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liable to distort competition on the Internal Market.
371
 As a general rule, only ‘internally 
distortive’ indirect tax relief is liable to distort competition.372  
Exceptionally, even neutral indirect taxes could distort competition and interstate trade, 
notably where consumer mobility cross Member State borders is significant.
373
 An 
example of such a situation would be the border area of Northern Ireland, where petrol and 
diesel duties are significantly higher than those applied in Ireland, which causes consumer 
leakage from Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland.
374
 Another example susceptible 
to have cross border effects is waste levies, as waste handlers may be motivated to 
transport waste across the border to a Member State applying a lower or no waste levy. In 
such cases, the trade between Member States will definitively be affected, and potentially 
even lead to harmful tax competition between neighbouring Member States. 
5.5. Permissible Fiscal Aid for Environmental Protection 
5.5.1. Environmental Taxes under the GBER 
Aid which meets the criteria set by Article 107 TFEU can be declared compatible with the 
Internal Market by the Commission. Pursuant to the standstill obligation in Article 108(3) 
such aid must be notified prior to adopting the aid measure. Since the main concern in this 
dissertation has been whether or not taxes which the Member States have adopted without 
notifying it to the Commission in advance, the fact that environmental taxes could be 
permissible if only they were notified has not yet been discussed. Presenting when aid can 
be accepted by the Commission following notification illustrates the scope of the 
applicable exceptions. The notification procedure is not a simple rubber stamp on Member 
States environmental tax measures, but limits the possibilities of adopting environmental 
taxes in many ways. It is also true that the Commission’s efforts for greening State aid law 
have principally been realised through the Environmental Aid Guidelines and the R&D 
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Framework for environmental taxes aimed at creating incentives for innovation,
375
 which 
do not relate to the application of Article 107(1) TFEU but to aid which is permissible 
despite not being compatible under said Article. Therefore, it is reasonable to take a brief 
look into the types of aid that does constitute State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU, but that 
can be declared compatible with the Internal Market after having been notified to the 
Commission pursuant to the procedure set out in Article 108(3) TFEU. 
The GBER, alongside with the de minimis-regulation discussed above, differs from the 
other exemptions from Article 107(1) TFEU in the sense that it allows Member States to 
adopt certain environmental tax measures without fulfilling the notification procedure set 
out in Article 108(3) TFEU.
376
 Measures adopted under the GBER need only to be 
published in the OJ and the aid scheme must include an express publication reference to 
the OJ.
377
 Environmental Tax measures which have been published in the OJ pursuant to 
their compatibility under the GBER include various types of tax relief, mostly related to 
rebates, reductions and exemptions from excises on energy and electricity. The less typical 
examples the State aid communicated by Member States the abatement from the Danish 
sulphur tax.
378
  
The on-going project for the Modernisation of State Aid aims on extending the scope of 
measures which would be allowed under the GBER, which would add to the efficiency of 
State aid control.
379
 From the perspective of the Member States, it would be a welcome 
addition to the GBER if the permissibility of fiscal measures for environmental protection 
would be more detailed in the GBER so as to allow for the development of environmental 
taxation without the burdensome procedure of notifying measures to the Commission in 
advance.  
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5.5.2. Automatically Permissible Aid 
If the aid measure neither falls within the scope of the de minimis-regulation nor the 
GBER, the tax aid can still be declared compatible with the Internal Market if it is notified 
to the Commission in advance. The Commission considers some types of aid as 
automatically compatible with the Internal Market, namely social aid granted to 
consumers, aid to repair damages of natural disasters or exceptional occurrences and aid to 
the German regions which suffered from the division of Germany. These grounds are listed 
exhaustively in Article 107(2) TFEU, and as exceptions to the general principle they must 
be interpreted narrowly.
380
  
On a first reading one could draw the conclusion that indirect tax relief from environmental 
taxes could fall within the scope of Article 107(2)(a) TFEU as being ‘aid having a social 
character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without 
discrimination related to the origins of the products concerned’. Tax relief from 
environmental taxes directed to underprivileged consumers could meet the description.
381
 
As to indirect taxes, the ‘social character’ of the aid could for instance be justified if the 
indirect tax relief is aimed at household electricity, since electricity costs are normally 
relatively higher for low-income households. Further, a certain part of indirect tax relief is 
transferred to the final consumer, which would correspond to the wording of Article 
107(2)(a) TFEU. Nevertheless, the textual interpretation of the provision, saying the aid 
must be granted ‘to individual consumers’ could be considered to exclude the possibility of 
indirect tax relief being considered as acceptable under said Article.  
As I discussed in the Chapter concerning the ‘dilemma of the recipient’ of indirect tax 
relief, an aid which is granted directly to consumers might fall outside the scope of Article 
107(1) TFEU entirely, since the recipient is not an ‘undertaking’. In such a case the 
exception in 107(2)(a) would certainly seem superfluous. However, as the matter is not yet 
settled, the Commission and the ECJ might consider that indirect tax advantages do 
constitute State aid even when conferred to consumers. In such a case the exemption in 
Article 107(2)(a) TFEU would become relevant as a ground for permitting indirect 
environmental tax relief granted to consumers. 
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Regarding the exemption for aid being granted to individual consumers, the Commission 
has interpreted that aid which is granted to air passengers indirectly through airlines can be 
permitted under Article 107(2)(a). The case concerned an aid to vulnerable passenger 
groups, such as students, pensioners and handicapped persons for tickets on the flight route 
between Paris and Corsica. The aid was allocated by reimbursement to all airlines 
operating the route from Paris to Corsica upon verification for each passenger eligible for 
the reimbursement.
382
 The Commission stated that although the aid was not paid directly to 
the consumers, the reimbursement system was a practical way of distributing the aid 
without undermining its cause.
383
 In contrast to this, aid granted indirectly through the 
employer of an individual has been interpreted as not being permissible aid to individual 
consumers as given in Article 107(2)(a) TFEU, but as an indirect advantage to certain 
undertakings.
384
 
When interpreting indirect tax relief in light of the above examples, indirect tax relief 
would in my opinion seem closer to the case of aid to the Corsican air passengers than to 
that of aid being allocated via employers. The most pertinent difference between the 
indirect tax relief and the direct subsidy for airline tickets is perhaps that the aid to 
passengers to or from Corsica concerned a distinct sum of money – EUR 41 per customer 
and flight.
385
 This can have made the reimbursement system somewhat more transparent in 
the Commission’s view than the passing on of indirect taxes, even if the passing on is 
made mandatory. Moreover, despite it not being mentioned expressly in the Commission’s 
evaluation, it seems to me that the lack of competition played a significant role in 
determining the Corsican aid compatible with the Internal Market. The distance from Paris 
to Corsica is such that other forms of transportation than flying do not amount to 
substitutable service. Had there been train transport, for instance, which would be 
substitutable with flying, the aid would potentially have been considered as benefitting the 
airlines and not the consumers after all. In particular case of air transport, however, the GC 
has in another decision taken the view that train and air transport are not substitutable with 
each other.
386
 In more general terms I believe the existence of substitutable goods or 
services would amount to ‘internal distortion’, whereby the Commission would find that 
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indirect tax relief is in fact granted to the undertakings and not the consumers, because 
reduced prices will attract clients away from the using the substitutable service or good and 
consequently increase the market share of the undertakings whose customers receive the 
tax advantage. 
One could conclude that tax relief from environmental taxes might be permitted under 
Article 107(2)(a) TFEU, provided that i) it is of social character, ii) the passing on of the 
tax relief can be monitored sufficiently, leaving no doubt to the Commission to think that 
the aid will in fact favour the undertakings instead of the consumers, and iii) there is no 
substituting product or service available, which does not benefit from the tax exemption. 
5.5.3. Aid in Accordance with Article 107(3)(c) 
The Environmental Aid Guidelines provide for detailed guidelines on which types of 
environmental aid can be considered compatible with the common market within the 
meaning of Article 107(3)(c),
387
 which allows for aid to ‘facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’. The 
measures which can be permitted under said Article also include fiscal aid.
388
 Fiscal aid in 
the form of tax exemptions and reductions must, however, not undermine the 
environmental objectives pursued by the legislation in question, nor may they fall below 
the minimum levels of harmonised taxes, such as excises.
389
 The Commission may declare 
a measure compatible with the Internal Market, if the tax measure is necessary and 
proportional. Aid which meets all of the following three criteria shall be considered 
necessary: 
i) the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria, equal to 
all competitors in a similar factual situation 
ii) the environmental tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in 
production costs for each sector or category of individual beneficiaries, and  
iii) those costs cannot be passed on to customers without sales being significantly reduced. 
To comply with the requirement of proportionality, the Commission has outlined several 
different means of fulfilling the criterion. According to the first option, the tax relief is 
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proportionate if it is broadly equivalent with the environmental performance of the 
beneficiaries, which cannot exceed the part of the costs of the environmental efforts, which 
cannot be passed on the consumers. The second option is that the reduced tax amounts to at 
least 20 % of the national tax and the third option entails that the undertakings receiving 
the tax aid must conclude an agreement on environmental targets with the Member State 
which essentially leads to the same effect as is if options one or two were applied, or it the 
minimum level of tax set by EU law were to be applied.
390
 
In Finland’s answer to the Commission’s consultation on the renewal of the Environmental 
Aid Guidelines, it is pointed out that as to entirely national taxes, the conditions for 
applying such a tax are nearly impossible to comply with.
391
 Moreover, national 
environmental taxes do not, in the view of the Finnish Government, as a rule distort 
competition in the Internal Market as any purely national tax would only add to the tax 
burden of national undertakings, whereas undertakings from other Member States would 
not be subjected to the tax. Therefore, in Finland’s view, the assessment hould be different 
for harmonised taxes (where the national tax level is below EU minimum) and for entirely 
national taxes.
 392
 
The conclusion of national taxes not being distortive is, however, not entirely convincing 
in light of the different types of environmental taxes which may be applied nationally. The 
example used by the Finnish government is waste tax; however, even waste taxes can 
become a burden on non-domestic undertakings. For instance, a waste tax measure which 
is constructed as a closed system could be distortive. For instance in the case concerning 
the French animal waste service, the tax to finance the aid was paid by the retailers, but it 
benefitted slaughterhouses and farmers who were consequently able to dispose of animal 
waste for free.
393
 As a consequence, meat products of foreign slaughterhouses and farmers 
who would not benefit from the animal waste service were put in a less favourable position 
than those of national undertakings. Their products are subjected to the tax, but they do not 
benefit from the aid. On the other hand, when it comes to waste taxes which are not 
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connected to an aid measure, it is true, that in principle, the tax should not have a distortive 
effect on competition or intrastate trade unless it is internally distortive.
 394
 
Some examples of environmental tax measures which have been declared permissible 
pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU exist. However, as pointed out by the Finnish 
government, the Environmental Aid Guidelines are rather demanding, which can 
discourage Member States from adopting environmental taxes. 
5.5.4. Compensation for Discharging Public Service Obligations 
Pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU, compensation for public service obligations imposed on 
undertakings should not be considered as State aid as long as the services are not 
overcompensated, provided that the measure has been notified to the Commission under 
the procedure set out in Article 108 TFEU.
395
 The well-known set of conditions established 
by the ECJ in order to identify when ‘aid’ may be granted as compensation for SGEI were 
listed for the first time in the Altmark case. The four conditions are: 
1. The beneficiary must be entrusted with a clearly defined public service mission; 
2. The parameters for calculating the compensation payments must be established in 
advance in an objective and transparent manner; 
3. Compensation must not exceed the cost incurred in the discharge of the public service 
minus the revenues earned with providing the service (the compensation may, however, 
include a reasonable profit) 
4. The beneficiary is chosen in a public tender or compensation does not exceed the costs 
of a well-run undertaking that is adequately equipped with the means to provide the public 
service.
396
 
Environmental aspects can be taken into account in under the fourth criterion, where 
environmental aspects have been part of the public procurement procedure in accordance 
with EU law. Kingston has pointed out that even where the Altmark-criteria are not met, 
the assessment under Article 106(2) TFEU can sometimes be less stringent and allow for 
aid to environmental public services.
397
 In practice, the Commission has for instance 
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approved of aid to the disposal and elimination of hazardous waste as being a SGEI.
398
 An 
example of tax measures related to SGEIs is the French ‘CSPE’ tax399 intended to offset 
the additional costs related to expenses borne by electricity distributors (ÉDF and the local 
distribution companies) in relation to their public service obligations, including the 
obligation to buy renewable electricity. The compatibility of the CSPE with the provisions 
on State aid is currently being contested as a whole, and a reference for a preliminary 
ruling on the issue is pending in the ECJ.
400
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6. Summarising the Main Findings and Some Concluding Remarks 
6.1. Permissible Environmental Taxes and the Objectives behind the Legislation 
In the beginning of this dissertation I defined three main questions to be answered in this 
dissertation: 
1) What types of environmental taxes and derogations thereof are permissible in light of 
the criteria for forbidden State aid in Article 107(1) TFEU? 
2) How are the objectives behind State aid control and environmental policy in the EU 
taken into consideration in the above interpretation of environmental taxes? 
3) How should national legislators take State aid control into consideration when adopting 
national fiscal measures to pursue environmental policy? 
I shall address my two first research questions together in the following, and return to the 
third question in the last Chapter of the dissertation. As to the first question, one of the 
main findings is that only rather few, carefully designed environmental taxes escape being 
defined as State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. The fact that the environmental aim itself 
is acceptable does not take the tax very far in the assessment of State aid. Although all four 
criteria expressed in the Article must be fulfilled for a measure to be considered as State 
aid, they are interpreted strictly, which makes it hard to escape even one of them. One 
could say that the definition and interpretation of State aid is successful in the sense that it 
is hard to circumvent.  
However, the strict approach also leads to many measures being notified to the 
Commission, even where those measures were never intended as State aid nor have similar 
effects. On the other hand, there is a large variety between those environmental tax 
measures which actually do escape the definition of prohibited State aid. This is due 
precisely to the fact that it is enough that a tax measure does not meet one of four criteria 
for it not to be considered as State aid. 
Therefore, the foregoing analysis does not result in one single model for an environmental 
tax which takes all aspects of State aid control into account in order to escape it. Instead, 
there are several ways of constructing an environmental tax measure so that will be 
permissible from the point of view of State aid. However, since the State aid aspect is only 
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one of the things which must be taken into account when introducing an environmental tax 
measure, some of the theoretical constructions of tax measures which could be escape the 
State aid criteria are not feasible in practice. Moreover, they might be in conflict with other 
provisions EU law. Therefore, the suggested permissible forms of environmental tax aid 
should be seen only as indications of what elements can be used in order to render a tax 
measure more compatible with the rules concerning State aid. 
Nevertheless, the analysis I have conducted in this dissertation does imply that certain 
types of environmental tax measures which are used in Member States can escape State aid 
control. As discussed in Chapter 5.1, some tax measures may be held as not constituting 
State aid because they do not confer an advantage on an undertaking. Thus, they do not 
fulfil the first of the cumulative criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU. Instead of benefiting an 
undertaking, the benefit of the indirect tax relief goes directly to the consumer. Bringing 
the tax relief close to the consumer is also in line with the objectives of environmental 
taxes. The environmental externalities are internalised into the consumer price, and 
moreover, the administrative costs for undertakings should be lower for a tax measure than 
for direct regulation. 
However, in light of empirical evidence as well as the ECJs interpretation of cases of 
recovery of unduly collected indirect taxes, the possibility to escape the criterion is limited. 
This is natural since even when passing on the entire tax relief of an indirect tax, an 
undertaking may benefit from an increased market share as a result of the overall price 
reduction. The case law implies that the passing on of a tax measure can only be used as a 
defence only as long as it is indisputably proven – for instance when the passing on is 
mandatory by law. Moreover, it must be made sure that the undertaking does not benefit 
indirectly from the tax relief, and the obligations to pass on the costs is followed up by 
accounting measures to verify that the tax relief is not kept by the undertaking.
401
 
The second criterion of Article 107(1) TFEU concerns the use of State resources. Aid 
which is not funded by the Member State or by resources controlled by it is permitted. 
Taxes themselves are by definition governed by the State, but different levy like systems 
have been applied by associations for instance.
402
 Moreover, to be considered as forbidden 
State aid, the tax relief must also be granted by the State, and not the EU. Environmental 
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tax relief which results directly from EU law is therefore permitted.
403
 The application of 
this exception is narrow, since only mandatory provisions EU law are concerned. It is also 
good to keep in mind that even when permissible under State aid control, a scheme which 
uses privately funded aid measures which are imposed by the State might be at variance 
with the rules regarding freedom to provide services, for instance. In addition, complex 
tariff systems financed by privately imposed levies might in my opinion become an 
administrative burden for the undertakings subject to it. 
The third criterion, selectivity, prove to be the most crucial when assessing environmental 
taxes. As to geographical selectivity, symmetrical devolution of environmental taxation 
powers to regions of a Member State would normally be considered as permissible, even 
when resulting in different tax rates in different regions. When it comes to material 
selectivity, the ECJs interpretation of State aid seems somewhat rigid. This is true 
particularly in cases where the aid itself would improve the environment and even further 
objectives set by common EU policy, such as reducing CO2-emissions. Moreover, even 
derogatory measures from environmental taxes, such as exemptions and reductions might 
be profitable for the environment, since they may allow the gradual adoption of new 
environmental taxes while maintaining the competitiveness of undertakings.  
When analysing the ECJs interpretation of selectivity, it seems that an environmental tax 
may be permissible under Article 107(1) TFEU only if it is technologically neutral. As to 
derogations from environmental taxes, it seems that apart from derogations which concur 
with technological neutrality, only justifications which pass the system test can be allowed. 
An example is the progressivity of a tax. Such internal justifications could be in flagrant 
conflict with the environmental objectives of the national tax. Even more so, they could be 
contrary to the PPP and the objective of internalising environmental costs, so that 
undertakings polluting less would actually have to contribute more. The right to adhere to 
the guiding principles of national tax systems is, however, an expression of the fiscal 
autonomy of Member State. Therefore, one can only be certain that tax measures which 
pass the system test by being the result of a guiding principle of national tax law are 
permissible.  
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Other derogations, which are not directly derived from guiding principle of national tax 
systems, are less likely to be permitted. However, a more objectives-based approach as 
emerged in case law and has been defended by a number of legal scholars. Such an 
approach would also be better in line with the objectives of environmental taxes, such as 
maintaining competitiveness while promoting sustainable growth. Economic and social 
derogations can also be necessary in order to avoid harming the competitiveness of an 
industry when introducing an environmental tax. Although it is true that Member States 
may be inclined to resort to environmental justifications in order to conceal State aid, such 
circumvention could be prohibited by applying the proportionality principle, as suggested 
in Chapter 5.3.4. As new environmental taxes are adopted, new case law will also indicate 
whether the objectives-based approach has become the main approach to the interpretation 
of material selectivity. 
As to the fourth criterion, liability to distort competition and effect on interstate trade, the 
most important finding is that environmental taxes do not necessarily have an effect on 
interstate trade, since the tax is imposed at destination. This is due to the fact that not only 
national undertakings profit from indirect tax relief, but also non-domestic undertakings 
exporting their goods to the State with more lenient taxation. Consequently, an indirect 
environmental tax is unlikely to produce harmful tax competition or amount to 
protectionism, the combating of which is one the objectives of State aid in general. Said 
environmental taxes should in my mind be considered prima facie permissible, with the 
exception of internally distortive taxes or for instance areas with considerable consumer 
mobility. 
Summing it up for the first two research questions of this dissertation, national 
environmental tax measures can be permissible if constructed with due regard to the 
interpretation of the four criteria for prohibited State aid. As regards the second research 
question of this dissertation, it is clear from the above conclusions that national 
environmental taxes are more likely to be permitted if they adhere to the general objectives 
of environmental taxation. A tax measure that aims at a) internalising environmental 
externalities and adhering to the PPP, b) reducing administrative costs c) promoting 
sustainable growth while maintaining competitiveness and d) providing an incentive to 
continuous improvement of the environment, will therefore be more likely to escape either 
the criterion of selectivity. Moreover, the indirect nature of environmental taxes, and more 
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specifically the fact that they are normally taxed at the destination, makes them less 
infringing on the objectives of State aid control. As explained earlier on in this dissertation, 
differences in indirect tax rates do not induce harmful tax competition in the same way as 
direct taxes. Moreover, indirect taxes are less susceptible to be used as protectionist 
measures, precisely because they apply similarly to domestic and non-domestic 
undertakings. 
6.2. Practical Guidelines to Introducing Environmental Taxes 
The third and last issue I wanted to address in this thesis was a practical one. In the 
following I therefore summarise some practical recommendations as to adopting 
environmental taxes while adhering to the rules concerning State aid. The method of this 
dissertation has been legal dogmatics, whereby this last question can only be answered in 
very general terms. The analysis of how the criteria for State aid are assessed when it 
comes to environmental taxes did, however, reveal some general ideas of what should be 
taken into account when introducing environmental taxes.  
At the outset of this dissertation; my focus on the subject of environmental taxation was on 
finding out what environmental tax measures can be permitted under Article 107(1) TFEU 
without being notified to the Commission. Nevertheless; the primary conclusion to be 
drawn from this dissertation is that the scope of the notification duty set out in Article 
108(3) TFEU cannot and should not be avoided when introducing environmental tax 
measures. This is the most rational approach for a national legislator, since the 
interpretation of the criteria for State aid is strict. Whether the tax measures are ones that 
are in line with the environmental objectives of the EU, such as the PPP, or ones that 
reduce the tax burden of environmental taxes for purposes such as maintaining the 
competitiveness of certain sectors, the strictness of State aid control should not be 
underrated. Rightly so, since, as put persuasively by Luja, a strict interpretation of which 
types of measures should be notified is reasonable, since ‘State aid contol is, by definition 
an area that calls for supranational supervision’.404 
An element which in my mind would seem more important than avoiding notification duty 
would be the construction of the tax measures so that it is in line with Article 107(1) 
TFEU. This would allow the Commission to draw the conclusion that the measure in 
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question does not constitute State aid at all, even if it has been notified. In such a case, the 
Member State may implement the tax measure as intended and push for a more 
environmentally justified tax policy on a long-term basis, without being restricted by time 
limits set by the Commission. This way, the Member States retain the possibility to further 
the use of green taxes as they seem of be one of the key solutions to environmental 
protection while the European ETS is struggling. Moreover, by notifying a tax measure 
despite considering it to not amount to State aid, a Member State can considerably increase 
legal certainty for recipient undertakings.  
On the other hand, viewed from the perspective of Member States, the notification process 
is one that delays the adoption of tax measures as well as renders the process of adopting 
taxes complicated. In my opinion, a delayed tax measure will still be worthwhile, 
especially if declared compatible with Article 107(1) TFEU. It would be logical that the 
incentivising effect of the tax measure would not be diminished even if the adoption of the 
measure is delayed – on the contrary, the measure might receive more attention from 
undertakings and media and be more effectively considered in pricing when the situation 
has been legally clarified. 
Furthermore, when introducing environmental taxes, it is of utmost importance to adhere to 
the objectives of environmental taxes as expressed by the Commission: Environmental tax 
measures which are in line with the PPP are more likely to be considered as compatible 
with the internal market. As the objectives-based approach may become the main approach 
of the ECJ and the Commission in the assessment of selectivity of environmental taxes, it 
may also be wise to construct national environmental taxes so that they would pass the 
proportionality test. Member States should therefore strive to justify the tax measure with 
permissible environmental objectives and prove that the measure is proportionate in such a 
way that it does not confer a more important advantage on the recipient undertakings than 
is necessary for attaining the objectives pursued, such as the PPP or in case of reduced 
environmental taxes, e.g. preventing tax avoidance or maintaining competitiveness of a 
certain industry. In this way, the Member State is better prepared to justify both the prima 
facie selectivity of a tax measure and its potential restrictive effects on the free movement 
provisions. 
Moreover, it has become evident that Member States apply different combinations of taxes, 
tariffs and privately funded aid together with direct regulation in order to further 
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environmental aims. As an example of this I presented the French closed system of 
imposing an environmental levy on the final consumer and then allocating the proceeds of 
the levy back to the same sector based on for instance social or economic policy. The 
model is based on the idea that environmental taxes lose their effect when accompanied by 
tax breaks and exemptions, which is why such taxes should be applied consistently in 
accordance with the environmental harm caused, that is to say in accordance with the PPP. 
Further, the proceeds from the tax should be allocated through a separate mechanism, 
which takes into account other objectives, such as competitiveness, regional allocation of 
resources and social issues.  
According to the above reasoning, separating the aid from the tax will help maintaining the 
incentive effect as well as the signalling effect of the environmentally justified tax 
measure, while simultaneously using the proceeds from the tax measure to abrogate for 
instance competitive disadvantages caused by the tax. I find this logic is fairly convincing, 
but it does not seem to have been fully endorsed by the EU institutions. Therefore, 
adopting environmental tax measures which resemble closed systems or other types of 
measures which canalise aid through private entities may be less attractive than what may 
first seem to be the case. Regardless of the private nature of such aid measures, they should 
be notified to make sure that the Commission does not consider there to be State control 
over the resources distributed. 
On a final note, I find it important to point out that adopting of national indirect taxes to 
promote environmental protection can be rather desirable from the point of view of State 
aid control, even when combining such measures with tax breaks or exemptions. In other 
words, indirect taxes can, in my view, be recommended as an instrument of environmental 
policy. This is so since indirect taxes, which are taxed at the destination, are fairly unlikely 
to produce harmful tax competition with the exception of areas with extensive consumer 
mobility. Moreover, the objective of continuous incentives for improving the environment 
would be difficult to realise with other types of regulation. Therefore, indirect 
environmental taxes deserve to be further developed. As long as an EU-wide agreement on 
environmental taxation cannot be reached, the responsibility of introducing taxes lies on 
the Member States. The on-going project for developing the Environmental Aid Guidelines 
is therefore an important step to facilitating the adoption of national environmental taxes. 
